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1591 
RED TAPE TIGHTROPE: REGULATING 
FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN FDA 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the oral 
contraceptive Yasmin for use.
1
 A similar contraceptive, Yaz, was 
approved in 2006.
2
 Both drugs are manufactured by Bayer, a 
pharmaceutical company. As early as 2004, Bayer scientists reported that 
Yasmin carries a “‘several-fold increase’ in reporting rates for blood clots 
compared to three other oral contraceptives, and that Yasmin’s rate of all 
serious adverse events was ‘10 fold higher’ than that of other products.”3 
Despite this, the FDA approved Yaz two years later, though it contained 
the same hormone that caused the blood clots in Yasmin.
4
 A 2009 study 
found that this hormone, drospirenone, increased a user’s risk of venous 
thromboembolism by a factor of 6.3.
5
  
Yaz and Yasmin have been linked to 100 deaths, and over 10,000 
lawsuits have been filed against Bayer claiming that consumers have been 
harmed by taking the contraceptives.
6
 In December 2011, the FDA 
reexamined Yaz and Yasmin.
7
 A panel voted to include the risk of blood 
clots on labels, though it declined to require Bayer to indicate that the risk 
was any greater than that for other contraceptives, despite a study 
published in the British Medical Journal that indicated that the risk of 
 
 
 1. Yasmin Prescription Drug Pharmaceutical Information, THE DRUG LIBRARY, http://www.the 
druglibrary.com/drug-0127.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).  
 2. FDA Approves YAZ(R), The First Oral Contraceptive to Offer Drospirenone in a 24-Day, 
Active-Pill Regimen, MED. NEWS TODAY (Mar. 21, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.medicalnewstoday. 
com/releases/39844.php.  
 3. Jeanne Lenzer & Keith Epstein, The Yaz Men: Members of FDA Panel Reviewing the Risks 
of Popular Bayer Contraceptive Had Industry Ties, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2012/01/the_yaz_men_members_of_fda_pan03 
4651.php. 
 4. Id.  
 5. A. van Hylckama Vlieg et al., The Venous Thrombotic Risk of Oral Contraceptives, Effects of 
Oestrogen Dose and Progestogen Type: Results of the MEGA Case-Control Study, 339 BRIT. MED. J. 
561, 561 (2009). Venous thromboembolism “is the development of a blood clot (thrombus) in a vein 
due to reduced blood flow and abnormal coagulation.” Venous Thrombosis and Embolism, 
MDGUIDELINES, https://www.mdguidelines.com/venous-embolism-and-thrombosis/definition (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2014) (website log-in required).  
 6. Pam Belluck, More Detail on Risk Urged for a Contraceptive Label, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/health/policy/stronger-label-urged-for-
yaz-and-yasmin-contraceptives.html?_r=0.  
 7. Id.  
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blood clots were twice as high for users of Yaz and Yasmin than for other 
contraceptives.
8
 The FDA panel voted 15-11 to allow the contraceptives to 
remain on the market, finding that their benefits to consumers outweighed 
their risks.
9
 Scientists and consumer advocates soon observed, however, 
that four (possibly five) members of the FDA panel had financial ties to 
Bayer, and all four voted to keep the drugs on the market.
10
 They each had 
disclosed these conflicts of interest to the FDA, and the FDA allowed 
them to vote on the panel anyway.
11
 In February 2013, Bayer faced 
roughly 13,600 lawsuits in the United States regarding the contraceptives, 
excluding claims already settled.
12
 Further, as of February 2013, Bayer had 
also “reached agreements, without admission of liability, to settle the 
claims of approximately 4,800 claimants in the U.S. for [about $1 
billion.]”13 Yaz and Yasmin are still on the market, and Bayer profited 
$1.42 billion from them in 2012.
14
 
This incident is only the latest of several in recent years that have 
caused many to question the FDA’s transparency and bias in its review 
and approval processes. Conflict of interest within FDA advisory 
committees has been discussed before,
15
 but several new regulations have 
loosened FDA conflict of interest requirements, and recent events such as 
the Bayer incident raise questions as to whether the current regulations are 
effective. Further examination of these issues is in order. This Note 
explores the depths of financial conflicts of interest in these processes, 
how they are regulated, and how they should be regulated. Part II 
 
 
 8. Id.; see also Øjvind Lidegaard et al., Risk of Venous Thromboembolism From Use of Oral 
Contraceptives Containing Different Progestogens and Oestrogen Doses: Danish Cohort Study, 2001-
9, 343 BRIT. MED. J. d6423 (2011), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d6423.  
 9. Merrill Goozner, Conflict of Interest Scandal Rocks FDA, THE FISCAL TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012, 
6:26 PM), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Blogs/Gooz-News/2012/01/12/Conflict-of-Interest-Scandal-
Rocks-FDA.aspx#page1.  
 10. Lenzer & Epstein, supra note 3.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Annual Report 2012: 32. Legal Risks, BAYER GRP., http://www.annualreport2012.bayer.com/ 
en/legal-risks.aspx#32_1 (last updated Feb. 28, 2013). Bayer had settled all but 5,000 claims in the 
United States by October 18, 2013. BAYER GRP., STOCKHOLDERS’ NEWSLETTER, FINANCIAL REPORT 
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2013: THIRD QUARTER OF 2013: BAYER CONTINUES POSITIVE BUSINESS 
MOMENTUM 65, available at http://www.stockholders-newsletter-q3-2013.bayer.com/en/bayer-stock 
holders-newsletter-3q-2013. pdfx.  
 13. BAYER GRP., BAYER ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 273 (2013), available at http://www.annual 
report 2012.bayer.com/en/bayer-annual-report-2012.pdfx.   
 14. Id. at 70 (figure in report was converted from euros to dollars to reach $1.2 billion).  
 15. See Merrill Goozner, Conflicts of Interest in the Drug Industry’s Relationship with the 
Government, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2006); Saurabh Anand, Note, Using Numerical Statutory 
Interpretation to Improve Conflict of Interest Waiver Procedures at the FDA, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 
(2010).  
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discusses current conflict of interest regulations imposed upon the FDA. 
Part III examines the arguments for loosening regulations. Part IV 
addresses the argument for tightening regulations, including a more in-
depth discussion of the Yaz/Yasmin incident as well as other drug 
scandals that implicate the integrity of the FDA. Part V assesses the 
legitimacy of these arguments and makes a recommendation for avoiding 
conflicts of interest on advisory committees that jeopardize public safety. 
II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 
IMPOSED UPON THE FDA 
The FDA regulates approximately twenty-five cents per dollar spent in 
the United States.
16
 In 2008, this figure included $466 billion in food sales, 
$60 billion in cosmetics, $18 billion in vitamin supplements, and $275 
billion in drugs.
17
 Drug expenditures alone reached $329 billion in 2011 
and nearly $326 billion in 2012.
18
 
Given these figures, the ubiquity of drugs in America should come as 
no surprise. The Mayo Clinic estimates that 70% of Americans take at 
least one prescription drug, and that over half take at least two.
19
 Between 
11% and 20% of Americans take five or more prescription drugs in a 
given month.
20
 The very wealthy and the very poor tend to take more 
prescription drugs and more frequently than the middle class.
21
 The very 
 
 
 16. Gardiner Harris, The Safety Gap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2008/11/02/magazine/02fda-t.html; Executive Summary: Strategic Plan for Regulatory Science, 
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RegulatoryScience/ucm268095.htm 
(last updated Jan. 16, 2013).  
 17. Harris, supra note 16.  
 18. U.S. Prescription Drug Spending Drops For First Time In 58 Years, CBS NEWS (May 9, 
2013, 2:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-prescription-drug-spending-drops-for-first-time-in-
58-years/. This article attributes the 1% spending decrease from 2011 to 2012 to both remaining 
effects of the Great Recession and to increased availability of generic drugs. IMS Health predicts that 
drug sales will rise again in 2014 by more than 4% because of “fewer brand-name drugs losing patent 
protection and also an influx of newly insured patients” as the Affordable Care Act goes into effect. 
Katie Thomas, U.S. Drug Costs Dropped in 2012, But Rises Loom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/business/use-of-generics-produces-an-unusual-drop-
in-drug-spending.html.  
 19. Press Release, Mayo Clinic News Network, Nearly 7 in 10 Americans Take Prescription 
Drugs, Mayo Clinic, Olmsted Medical Center Find (June 19, 2013), http://newsnetwork.mayo 
clinic.org/discussion/nearly-7-in-10-americans-take-prescription-drugs-mayo-clinic-olmsted-medical-
center-find.  
 20. Id.; QIUPING GU, CHARLES F. DILLON, & VICKI L. BURT, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE CONTINUES TO INCREASE: U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG DATA FOR 
2007–2008 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf. The Mayo Clinic 
study estimates 20%, while Gu et al.’s study estimates 11%.  
 21. David Maris, Who is Popping All Those Pills?, FORBES MAG. (July 24, 2012, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmaris/2012/07/24/1-in-3-american-adults-take-prescription-drugs/. 
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poor, often the least educated, are the most likely to be taking four or more 
prescription drugs at a time.
22
 Americans consume 80% of the world’s 
pain medication.
23
 Setting aside growing criticism that American 
healthcare professionals overmedicate their patients and focus on 
treatment-based care rather than prevention,
24
 the FDA has a direct impact 
on drug safety. Its failures, whether through negligence, ignorance, or 
corruption, pose an immediate danger to the nearly three quarters of 
American citizens who use prescription drugs.  
A. The “Shared Pool” Dilemma 
The FDA approves drugs and devices through advisory committees of 
experts and representatives. The FDA uses fifty-one committees “to obtain 
independent expert advice on scientific, technical, and policy matters.”25 
The experts include academicians and practitioners in all healthcare 
fields.
26
 Committees also include industry representatives “[a]lmost 
without exception,”27 a consumer advocate, and sometimes a patient 
representative.
28
 (Industry representatives are non-voting members and are 
 
 
One could argue that the middle class is mentally and/or physically healthier than the poor or the 
wealthy; a less controversial explanation, and the one that Maris takes, is that the wealthy have the 
most comprehensive insurance policies, the poor often have Medicaid benefits, and thus the middle 
class is subjected to the most out-of-pocket expenses. Id. 
 22. Id. For an explanation of the widening educational gap associated with income, see Sabrina 
Tavernise, Poor Dropping Further Behind Rich in School, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/education-gap-grows-between-rich-and-poor-studies 
-show.html.  
 23. Michael Zennie, Americans Consume Eighty Percent of the World’s Pain Pills as 
Prescription Drug Abuse Epidemic Explodes, DAILY MAIL (May 10, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www. 
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2142481/Americans-consume-80-percent-worlds-pain-pills-prescription-
drug-abuse-epidemic-explodes.html#ixzz2A41u3Aps. 
 24. See, e.g., RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S 
BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS (2005); Dominick L. 
Frosch et al., Creating Demand for Prescription Drugs: A Content Analysis of Television Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising, 5 ANN. FAM. MED., January/February 2007, at 1, available at http://www. 
annfammed.org/content/5/1/6.full.pdf.  
 25. Advisory Committees, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last 
updated Sept. 22, 2014). This page states that it has fifty committees and panels, but a different FDA 
page explains that there are now fifty-one. July 17, 2012: FDA-TRACK Advisory Committees 
Quarterly Briefing Summary, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/track/ucm 
314987. htm (last updated Apr. 15, 2013).  
 26. Advisory Committees: Membership Types, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/Advisory 
Committees/AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/MembershipTypes/default.htm (last 
updated Jan. 22, 2014).  
 27. Advisory Committee Industry Representatives, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/ 
industry.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).   
 28.  Advisory Committees: Membership Types, supra note 26. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/8
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not subject to conflict of interest regulations.
29
) The scientific experts on 
these committees are also in high demand, precisely for their expertise, as 
consultants or clinicians for regulated industry.
30
 Nyssa Ackerley explains, 
“[a]cademic and institutional research also increasingly relies on industry 
sources for funding. This situation, whereby the same experts are in 
demand by both the federal government and regulated industry, has been 
described . . . as the ‘shared pool dilemma.’”31 Excluding these experts 
from decision-making on FDA advisory committees leaves only a “pool of 
‘experts’ less qualified than those disqualified, by virtue of the simple fact 
that [the more qualified experts] are so pre-eminent in their fields that 
industry seeks out their advice and services.”32 
Katherine McComas states that this shared pool dilemma rests upon 
two assumptions: first, “that a finite number of qualified experts exists for 
any given topic,” and second, “that the mere presence of a real or potential 
conflict of interest may result in a member acting in a biased manner.”33 
The assertion that too few non-conflicted experts exist to fill panels may 
be somewhat supported by the fact that roughly 23% of the FDA’s 
committee positions remain vacant.
34
 The FDA also sometimes has trouble 
convening a non-conflicted panel, which is arguably as detrimental to 
patients as eradicating conflicts from the panels.
35
 
 
 
 29. See, e.g., NYSSA ACKERLEY ET AL., MEASURING CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND EXPERTISE ON 
FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEES, EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, INC. (2007), available at http://www.fda. 
gov/oc/advisory/ergcoireport.pdf.  
 30. Id. (citing Elizabeth R. Glodé, Advising Under The Influence?: Conflicts Of Interest Among 
FDA Advisory Committee Members, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 293 (2002)).  
 31. Id. at 1–3 (citing Katherine A. McComas et al., Conflicted Scientists: The “Shared Pool” 
Dilemma of Scientific Advisory Committees, 14 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI., no. 3, at 285, 287 (2005), 
available at http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/22384/ssoar-2005-3-mccomas_ 
et_al-conflicted_scientists_the_shared_pool.pdf?sequence=1).  
 32. Richard Epstein, Unshackle the FDA From Rules That Kill Innovation, FORBES (Mar. 15, 
2012, 6:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2012/03/15/unshackle-the-fda-from-rules-
that-kill-innovation/. Epstein, a law professor at New York University, describes himself as “a law 
professor with eclectic interests and three homes.” He teaches many subjects, “strongly resisting all 
forms of specialization.” Richard Epstein, Contributor, FORBES, http:// http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
richardepstein/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).  
 33. McComas et al., supra note 31, at 287. 
 34. The percent of vacant committee positions reached 33% in 2010. The FDA’s efforts to 
reduce these vacancies were successful, with a 20% vacancy rate by the end of 2012. Perhaps due to 
the federal budget sequestration, the rate slowly started to rise, reaching 23% in June 2013, but had 
subsided to 17% by March 2014. Percent of FDA Advisory Committee Member Positions Vacant at 
the End of the Month, FDA.GOV, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/FDATrack/track?program=advisory-
committees&id=AdvComm-FDA-PercentVacant (last updated Mar. 31, 2014).  
 35. See, e.g., Thomas Sullivan, U.S. House Energy and Commerce PDUFA Hearing: 
Transformation of the FDA, POL’Y & MED. (July 21, 2011, 5:06 AM), http://www.policymed.com/ 
2011/07/us-house-energy-and-commerce-pdufa-hearing-transformation-of-the-fda.html [hereinafter 
PDUFA Hearing]; see also Matthew Herper, A Health Care Reform Law for the FDA, FORBES (June 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The shared pool dilemma, if it exists, leads to two possible outcomes, 
both of which carry frightening risks. First, the most qualified experts will 
sit on advisory committees, though some of them will necessarily have 
financial conflicts. On the other hand, if conflicted experts are excluded, 
the experts deciding the fate of a drug will be less qualified to make such 
an impactful decision than their conflicted counterparts. That is, those 
committee members with comparatively less expertise will be deciding the 
profits of an industry and the health of the patients potentially affected by 
the drug’s approval or rejection. The merits of the shared pool dilemma, 
and therefore the necessity that the FDA choose between these two 
uncomfortable outcomes, is discussed in Part III.  
McComas examines the difficulty of finding both qualified and 
disinterested experts.
36
 Though there may never be a way to prove a causal 
relationship between a committee member’s conflict of interest and a 
biased vote, this should not relieve the FDA of its duty to minimize that 
possibility. This apparent difficulty has caused a multitude of conflict of 
interest regulation to clarify precisely who is eligible to sit on an advisory 
committee,
37
 which conflicts can be disregarded, and which cannot. Yet, 
despite this, the conflict-related scandals persist, drugs get recalled, and 
people die.
38
 The next Section discusses these laws and their success at 
filtering advisors with financial conflicts.  
 
 
27, 2012, 11:31 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/ 06/27/a-health-
care-reform-law-for-the-fda/. Herper cites Eli Lilly’s blood thinner Effient as an example of a drug for 
which the FDA had difficulty convening a panel. However, he neglects to mention the details of the 
difficulty. In fact, Eli Lilly persuaded the FDA to remove from the panel a cardiologist who had 
openly questioned both the drug’s effectiveness and its risks. Effient was approved unanimously, 
despite a letter to the FDA from one of the drug’s inventors urging the committee not to approve the 
drug until it had gone through more rigorous clinical trials. The FDA later formally admitted it was 
wrong to have dismissed the cardiologist from the panel. Jim Edwards, FDA Admits It Was Wrong to 
Ax Critic of Lilly’s Effient, CBS NEWS (July 16, 2009, 3:28 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
505123_162-42842161/fda-admits-it-was-wrong-to-ax-critic-of-lillys-effient/.  
 36. McComas et al., supra note 31, at 291–92. 
 37. See, e.g., Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463 (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2 
(2012)); 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2012) (basic criminal conflict of interest statute); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR THE 
PUBLIC, FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS, AND FDA STAFF ON PROCEDURES FOR 
DETERMINING CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN FDA ADVISORY 
COMMITTEES (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ 
UCM125646.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC].  
 38. See, e.g., Belluck, supra note 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/8
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B. Current Conflict of Interest Regulations Imposed Upon the FDA  
Financial conflicts of interest impact FDA review and approval 
processes in two major ways. First, investigators compensated by study 
sponsors may feel pressure to produce results satisfactory to the sponsor, 
which are often and increasingly pharmaceutical companies.
39
 Thus, the 
studies presented to FDA advisory committees are often not objective, 
either because of investigators’ selective inattention to certain outcomes, 
deliberate manipulation of data, or somewhere in between on the 
spectrum.
40
 The second way conflicts of interest may affect the approval 
process occurs when investigators compensated by the study’s sponsors 
are the same individuals sitting on an FDA panel that votes to allow a 
product to reach the market.
41
 Though of course the same individuals may 
be implicated in either type of conflict, this Note focuses primarily on the 
second. The first implicates the integrity of individuals and drug 
companies; the second implicates the integrity of the FDA. The approval 
process is the final step before a potentially deadly (or life-saving, or 
completely inefficacious) drug reaches the market. This phase, more than 
any other phase in a drug’s life cycle from its inception to public 
consumption, must be free of personal financial conflicts.
42
  
 
 
 39. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance—Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539–44 (2000); Jeff Herman, Saving U.S. 
Dietary Advice from Conflicts of Interest, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 297 (2010) (citing Eric G. 
Campbell et al., Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Corporate Gifts Supporting Life Sciences 
Research, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 995, 997 (1998)); Paul A. Rochon, A Study of Manufacturer-
Supported Trials of Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154 ARCH. 
INTERN. MED. 157 (1994) (investigators who received money from industry often reported that the 
donor’s drug was safer than alternatives, despite the fact that the data supported such a conclusion less 
than half the time); Andreas Lundh et al., Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome, COCHRANE 
DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS no. 12, at 1–2 (2012), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10. 
1002/14651858.MR000033.pub2/pdf (subscription required) (concluding, among other things, that 
industry-sponsored studies tended to have “less agreement between the results and the conclusions 
than . . . non-industry sponsored studies”). 
 40. For a discussion on the many types of funding bias, see David Michaels, It’s Not the Answers 
That Are Biased, It’s the Questions, WASH. POST (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/14/AR2008071402145.html; see generally HARRY STACK 
SULLIVAN, FORTUNATE AND UNFORTUNATE USES OF SELECTIVE INATTENTION, IN CLINICAL STUDIES 
IN PSYCHIATRY 42 (1956) (discussing how selective inattention can be beneficial by helping one focus 
on the significant by ignoring the irrelevant, and can also yield harmful results when significant details 
are ignored).  
 41. See, e.g., Lenzer & Epstein, supra note 3.  
 42. That research companies manipulate trial data is unfortunate, but not surprising. See, e.g., 
David B. Resnik, Financial Interests and Research Bias, 8 PERSP. ON SCI., no. 3, at 255 (2000). This is 
why the FDA must be all the more scrupulous in the approval process; the FDA should be able to 
assure the public that there was one stage in the drug’s development where the decision to market it 
was determined by unconflicted participants.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Applicants for FDA approval of a product relying on clinical studies 
must disclose financial arrangements between the sponsor and the 
investigator.
43
 Members of an advisory committee must also disclose to 
the FDA financial ties to the applicant,
44
 so ignorance of such a conflict is 
typically not at issue. Rather, the conflicts are disclosed, usually from both 
ends; what to do with the knowledge of these conflicts (or not to do, as is 
often the case), is left to the FDA. The FDA does not include in its mission 
statement an attempt to eradicate conflict of interest from advisory 
committees; its mission with respect to drugs, as it should be, is simply to 
ensure their safety and effectiveness.
45
 Whether this goal can be achieved 
without eradicating conflict of interest, however, is another question. The 
amount of conflict of interest laws and regulations suggests an 
acknowledgment of the disastrous potential the “shared pool dilemma” 
carries with it. These laws are discussed below. 
1. Federal Advisory Committee Act 
Advisory committees are not unique to the FDA; approximately 1,000 
advisory committees exist at any given time, serving hundreds of federal 
agencies.
46
 Any advisory committee established by a federal agency must 
comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA).
47
 
FACA serves as a congressional recognition of “the merits of seeking the 
advice and assistance of [United States] citizens.”48 It also regulates the 
committees to ensure that committee advice is “relevant, objective, and 
 
 
 43. Disclosure requirements are codified at 21 C.F.R. § 54 (2000). Applicants are required to 
disclose: (1) financial arrangements between the study’s sponsor and its investigator when the study’s 
outcome “could increase the monetary value of the clinical investigator’s financial interest;” (2) 
“payments over $25,000 made by the sponsor to the investigator or institution during a clinical trial or 
within one year” of its completion; (3) proprietary interests in the tested product, including patent, 
trademark, or copyright interests;” and (4) equity interests in the sponsor over $50,000 in a publicly 
held sponsoring company during the trial or within one year of its completion. Jennifer A. Henderson 
& John J. Smith, Financial Conflict of Interest in Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of 
Federal and State Controls, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 450–51 (2002). 
 44. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 4 (2012). The financial disclosure form 
potential committee members must submit to the FDA is available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM048297.pdf.  
 45. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 46. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Brochure, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www. 
gsa.gov/portal/content/101010 (last updated May 19, 2014).  
 47. Pub. L. No. 92-463 (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2 (2012)). The committees are overseen by the 
U.S. General Services Administration pursuant to the law. Id.  
 48. FACA Brochure, supra note 46.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/8
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open to the public,” and that committees act efficiently and “[c]omply with 
reasonable cost controls and record keeping requirements.”49  
FACA is primarily geared toward efficiency, record keeping, and 
public disclosure.
50
 It requires disclosure of the identities of advisory 
committee members, existence of committees themselves, and funds at a 
committee’s disposal.51 Despite the inclusion of “objectivity” in its 
purpose, the law contains no limit upon who can sit on a committee, save 
for the ambiguous requirement that committees be “fairly balanced in 
terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be 
performed.”52 This balance inquiry is a case-by-case determination and 
depends on the authority of the agency.
53
 All views need not be 
represented to meet this balance requirement.
54
  
Indeed, the FDA has deliberately removed certain viewpoints from 
advisory committees. While waivers are granted for financial conflicts of 
interest, “intellectual conflicts of interest” are apparently taken much more 
seriously.
55
 Dr. Sidney Wolfe, the committee’s consumer advocate and the 
director of Public Citizen’s health research group,56 was removed from the 
advisory committee that approved Yaz and Yasmin because his widely-
read newsletter, “Worst Pills, Best Pills,” had already called for banning 
the drug because of its safety risks.
57
 An exasperated Dr. Wolfe stated that 
if being informed and subsequently forming an opinion based on that 
information constituted an intellectual conflict of interest, “many more 
 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. FACA 101, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/244333 (last 
updated June 11, 2014). 
 51. FACA, Pub. L. No. 92-463. It places advisory committees under congressional jurisdiction 
and requires House and Senate committees to conduct continuing reviews of advisory committees 
under their jurisdiction, determining their necessity, the appropriateness of their functions, and 
compliance with the law. Id.  
 52. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2) (2012). 
 53. See, e.g., 60 Comp. Gen. 386 (1981). 
 54. Id. Though all views need not be represented on an advisory committee, the issue of whether 
a committee is sufficiently balanced is justiciable. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323 
(5th Cir. 1999). 
 55. Susan Todd, FDA Disqualifies Public Citizen’s Chief Advocate From Meeting On Risky Birth 
Control, NJ.COM (Dec. 6, 2011, 10:41 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2011/12/fda_ 
disqualifies_public_citize.html. 
 56. Public Citizen is a national non-profit consumer advocacy group founded in 1971. About Us, 
PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2306 (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).  
 57. Goozner, supra note 9. Goozner incorrectly refers to the newsletter as “Best Pills, Worst 
Pills.” Wolfe also co-authored a 960-page book titled Worst Pills, Best Pills: A Consumer’s Guide to 
Avoiding Drug-Induced Death or Illness, along with Larry Sasich and Peter Lurie. Peter Lurie, M.D., 
M.P.H., to be discussed infra, is extensively well-versed on conflicts of interest in FDA advisory 
committees.  
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members of advisory committees would have to be excluded.”58 A 
spokesperson for the FDA simply stated, “We do value Dr. Wolfe’s 
contributions . . . but we are committed to preserving the integrity of the 
committee process.”59 
FACA also requires that any new legislation regarding advisory 
committees contain “appropriate provisions to assure that the advice and 
recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately 
influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest, but will 
instead be the result of the advisory committee’s independent judgment.”60 
By itself, this “independent judgment” requirement is unhelpful as it does 
not provide guidance on how to balance these interests. However, it 
provides some groundwork for later legislation affecting disclosure 
requirements, conflict waivers, and other regulations for FDA advisory 
committees. 
2. Government in the Sunshine Act (Freedom of Information Act) 
The Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (the “Act”) amended the 
Freedom of Information Act.
61
 It provides that, with ten exemptions, 
“every portion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public 
observation” and requires advance notice of such meetings.62 The Act also 
imposes procedural requirements an agency must take before determining 
that an exemption applies.
63
 
The relevant exemptions include release of information likely to 
“disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by [another] 
statute,” “disclose trade secrets and [privileged or confidential] 
commercial or financial information,” or “concern the agency’s issuance 
of a subpoena [or] the agency’s participation in a civil action or 
proceeding.”64  
Federal courts, not the agencies, are responsible for interpreting the 
statute.
65
 But inasmuch as the FDA is involved in determining propriety of 
information, it usually errs on the side of confidentiality.
66
 Courts have 
 
 
 58. Todd, supra note 55.  
 59. Id.  
 60. 5 U.S.C. App. 2. § 5(b)(3) (2012). 
 61. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 62. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (2012). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. § 552b(c)(3), (4), (10).  
 65. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 66. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws and Secrecy in 
Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF’S, no. 2, at 486 
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fallen on either side of the balancing test weighing the proprietary nature 
of information against the public interest in disclosure.
67
 Regardless of the 
reasons for withholding such information, nondisclosure necessarily limits 
the public’s access to the information upon which FDA advisory 
committee members base their decisions. The FDA has explained, 
“[i]nformation that will be considered by the advisory committee (i.e., the 
briefing package) is posted online prior to the meeting, with appropriate 
redaction of non-public information.”68  
Mark Goldberger, a former director of a Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research (“CDER”) office, stated that “[g]enerally, FDA takes the 
advice of advisory committees.”69 Although the FDA is not required to 
explain the reasons for accepting or rejecting the vote of the advisory 
committee, it imposes upon itself the obligation to publicize the basis for 
any decision not to heed the advisory committee’s recommendation.70  
The Act does shed light on the nature of advisory meetings, and 
perhaps most importantly, allows access to these meetings.
71
 However, its 
 
 
(2007), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/483.full.pdf (“[T]he FDA continued 
to limit release of submitted data, invoking the commercial-and-confidential-information provision in 
FOIA to oppose requests for unreleased information based on the prospect of substantial competitive 
harm.”).  
 67. Id. See also Teich v. Food & Drug Admin., 751 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that 
clinical mechanisms and data are not trade secrets and that release of information is in the public 
interest); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that data are not trade secrets, but may nonetheless be confidential); Citizens Comm’n on 
Human Rights v. Food & Drug Admin., 1993 WL 1610471 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 1993), aff’d in 
pertinent part, 45 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that data was a protected trade secret). 
 68. TRANSPARENCY TASK FORCE FDA, FDA TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE: DRAFT PROPOSALS 
FOR PUBLIC COMMENT REGARDING DISCLOSURE POLICIES OF THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION 57 (2010) [hereinafter TRANSPARENCY TASK FORCE], available at http://www.fda. 
gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/PublicDisclosure/GlossaryofAcronymsandAbbreviations/ 
UCM212110.pdf. 
 69. FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resources 
ForYou/Consumers/ucm289601.htm (last updated Apr. 25, 2014); see also Andrew Pollack, Diet Drug 
Wins Panel’s Approval, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05/11/health/diet-drug-wins-approval-of-fda-advisers.html; Lenzer & Epstein, supra note 3. 
 70. TRANSPARENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 68, at 57. 
 71. The Administrative Conference of the United States notes that despite the statute’s 
commendable objectives,  
its actual effect is to discourage collaborative deliberations at multi-member agencies, 
because agency members are reluctant to discuss tentative views in public . . . . [A]gencies 
resort to escape devices, such as holding discussions among groups of fewer than a quorum of 
the agency’s membership (which are not covered by the Act), communicating through staff, 
exchanging written messages, or deciding matters by ‘notation voting’ (i.e., circulating a 
proposal and having members vote in writing).  
Government in the Sunshine Act, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. (ACUS.GOV), http://www.acus.gov/ 
research/the-conference-current-projects/government-in-the-sunshine-act/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).  
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exemptions, particularly the exemption allowing for other statutory 
exemptions, may undermine its effectiveness.
72
  
3. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (Basic Criminal Conflict of Interest Statute) 
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 amended 18 U.S.C. § 208, the basic 
criminal conflict of interest statute.
73
 The statute, titled Acts Affecting A 
Personal Financial Interest, prohibits an employee of the executive 
branch (including special government employees, which encompasses 
advisory committee members) from participating in a government matter 
in which the member or anyone in the member’s immediate family has a 
financial interest.
74
 
Section 208(b) allows for several exceptions. Thus, disclosure of a 
financial relationship with the very industry that has developed the product 
to be approved does not preclude an advisory committee member from 
sitting on the committee or even from voting; members may be granted 
waivers for participation in meetings pursuant to these exceptions.
75
  
Waivers are often granted because the need for the member’s apparent 
expertise outweighs the potential damage his or her conflict of interest 
may cause. Waivers can be granted if the value of the financial interest is 
fully disclosed and the agency determines that “the interest is not so 
substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services 
which the Government may expect from such officer or employee.”76 A 
waiver need not be granted to allow participation if the financial interest is 
“too remote or too inconsequential to affect the integrity of the services of 
the Government officer.”77 Finally, specifically regarding advisory 
committee members, a waiver may be granted if the official responsible 
for appointing the advisor certifies in writing that “the need for the 
individual’s services outweighs the potential for a conflict of interest 
created by the financial interest involved.”78 Finally, denial of a waiver 
under any provision in sub-section (b) does not preclude the granting of a 
waiver under another subsection.
79
 
 
 
 72. In the Yaz/Yasmin incident, for example, the FDA and one of the implicated advisory 
committee members cited the confidentiality provisions of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. 
Appx. 4 §§ 101-505) as a basis for withholding financial information. Lenzer & Epstein, supra note 3.  
 73. Pub. L. No. 101–194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2012). 
 75. Id. § 208(b).  
 76. Id. § 208(b)(1). 
 77. Id. § 208(b)(2). 
 78. Id. § 208(b)(3). 
 79. Id. § 208 (c)(2). 
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4. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007(FDAAA) 
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
(“FDAAA”) amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.80 Title VII of 
the FDAAA controls conflicts of interest.
81
  
Section (b) of the statute deals with recruitment. It states that the FDA 
Secretary shall 
develop and implement strategies on effective outreach to potential 
members of advisory committees at . . . academic research centers, 
professional and medical societies, and patient and consumer 
groups; seek input from professional medical and scientific 
societies; [and] at least every 180 days, request referrals for 
potential members of advisory committees from a variety of 
stakeholders.
82
 
These “stakeholders” include product developers and patient groups, but 
not patient safety or consumer advocates. Perhaps surprisingly, 
recruitment activities may include advertising at medical and scientific 
conferences.
83
 The Secretary is also obliged to ensure that he or she has 
“access to the most current expert advice.”84 
If a committee member is granted a waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 208(b)(1) or (b)(3), the Secretary shall disclose on the FDA website, no 
later than fifteen days prior to an advisory committee meeting:  
the type, nature, and magnitude of the financial interests of the 
advisory committee member to which such determination or 
certification applies and . . . the reasons . . . for such determination 
or certification, including, as appropriate, the public health interest 
in having the expertise of the member with respect to the particular 
matter before the advisory committee.
85
  
The Secretary must also submit an annual report including the number of 
those disqualified from participation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208.
86
 
At least once every five years, the Secretary must review FDA 
guidance with respect to the application of § 208 and update such 
 
 
 80. 21 U.S.C. § 301-399f (2012). 
 81. 21 U.S.C. § 379d-1 (2012). 
 82. Id. § 379d-1(b)(1). 
 83. Id. § 379d-1(b)(2).  
 84. Id. § 379d-1(b)(3). 
 85. Id. § 379d-1(c)(1).  
 86. Id. § 379d-1(e)(1)(a). 
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guidance “as necessary to ensure that [FDA] receives appropriate access to 
needed scientific expertise, with due consideration of the requirements of 
such section 208.”87 
Until July 9, 2012, in granting a waiver, the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services could allow the member to 
vote on the committee or sit on the committee as a non-voting member.
88
 
The Food and Drug Safety and Innovation Act (FDSIA), among other 
things, loosened these conflict of interest provisions.
89
 The participation 
without voting option is completely dissolved. The current statute allows 
for waivers, but, perhaps sensibly, does not allow for the conclusion that a 
committee member’s conflict is too minor to preclude his presence and 
contribution to the meeting, but too significant to allow him to vote. Such 
an arrangement may suggest to other members, “this person is an expert, 
but her judgment may be clouded.” On the other hand, the deletion of the 
directive that “a member of an advisory committee may not participate . . . 
in an advisory committee meeting if such member . . . has a financial 
interest that could be affected by the advice given to the Secretary with 
respect to such matter”90 suggests that the real intention of the deletion 
was to loosen the conflict of interest requirements. Indeed, the Union of 
Concerned Scientists has decried the FDSIA’s relaxing of conflict of 
interest requirements, arguing that with the $700 million it spent on 
lobbying between 2009 and 2011, the drug industry had purchased undue 
influence on FDA advisory meetings.
91
 At the same time, the group 
expressed appreciation that the bill retained the disclosure requirement for 
advisors with conflicts.
92
  
The new statute also deleted a portion of the law requiring the 
percentage of committee members with waivers be reduced each year from 
2008 to 2012.
93
 The law used 2007 waivers as a base number, and allowed 
for 95% of this number to be granted in 2008, down to 75% of the 2007 
base number in 2012.
94
 This provision has since been struck (meaning that 
the FDA may grant as many waivers as it deems necessary), but the FDA 
 
 
 87. Id. § 379d-1(f)(1–2). 
 88. Pub. L. No. 110-85, Title VII, § 701(a), 121 Stat. 900 (repealed July 9, 2012). 
 89. Food and Drug Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012). 
 90. Pub. L. No. 110-85, Title VII, § 701(a), 121 Stat. 900 (repealed July 9, 2012). 
 91. Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Industry-Driven FDA Bill a Missed 
Opportunity for Patients: While Some Provisions are Positive, Congress Emphasized Speed Over 
Safety in New Law (June 26, 2012), archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20120710111758/ 
http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/fda-bill-1370.html. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Pub. L. No. 110-85, Title VII § 701(c)(2)(c).  
 94. Id. 
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never came close to reaching the cap between 2010 and the cap’s 
elimination in 2012.
95
 In the first six months of 2013, the percentage of 
participating committee members granted waivers was zero for all but two 
months, and peaked in March at 2.8%.
96
 This is fairly representative of the 
pattern since the FDA started publishing these data in 2010.
97
 If this self-
reporting is accurate, it appears that the FDA may subject itself to stricter 
rules than those Congress loosened for it in 2012.  
5. FDA Guidelines 
The language of the waiver statutes is ambiguous, and no statute 
specifies criteria that the Secretary should use in deciding whether to allow 
a committee member to vote. As a result, the FDA issued guidelines in 
2008.
98
 The document states: “This unified, simpler approach will improve 
consistency within the agency in considering advisory committee 
participation and will provide greater clarity to the public regarding how 
FDA selects members.”99 Notably, nowhere does the document suggest 
that allowing committee members with financial interests to make 
committee decisions compromises the integrity of the FDA’s advisory 
committees. The focus of the guidelines appears more on appeasing the 
public with transparency regarding conflicts of interest than attempting to 
eliminate them.
100
  
 
 
 95. Percent of Advisory Committee Members Participating in Meetings in the Month Who Were 
Granted Waivers, FDA.GOV, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/FDATrack/track?program=advisory-
committees&id=AdvComm-waivers (last updated Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Percent Granted 
Waivers]. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. See GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 37. 
 99. Id. at 6–7. 
 100. However, the FDA has traditionally protected the privacy interests of industry and has stated 
that only “rarely” would the public interest require disclosure of financial information. See FDA, 
GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, INDUSTRY, AND FDA STAFF: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY 
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS 23 (2011), archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20121126053826/ 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM256525.pdf.  
In the 2011 guidelines for investigators and industry, the FDA appeared to change its stance 
somewhat, possibly in the wake of public criticism. The guidelines stated that the FDA  
is striving to achieve a proper balance between transparency and the right to privacy of 
clinical investigators with respect to their financial arrangements as expressed in the agency’s 
protection of privacy regulation (21 C.F.R. pt. 21). The agency is considering various options 
for disclosure, such as [disclosing financial information] upon product approval for 
marketing.  
Id. at 24. For whatever reason, this language and any notion of the need to balance consumers’ interest 
in financial transparency with industry’s interest in privacy was omitted from the 2013 guidelines. See 
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, INDUSTRY, AND FDA STAFF: FINANCIAL 
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The waiver guidelines profess to be stricter than the previous 
guidelines released in 2000.
101
 For example, the guidelines state:  
Although 18 U.S.C. 208(b)(3) authorizes the agency to grant a 
waiver to [a special government employee (“SGE”)] where a 
balancing test is met—“the need for the individual’s services 
outweighs the potential for a conflict of interest created by the 
financial interest involved”—FDA will also apply to all waivers for 
SGEs the generally stricter standard established by section 712 
(c)(2)(B) of the Act, requiring a showing that the waiver “is 
necessary to afford the committee essential expertise.”102 
The new guidelines consist of ten steps to follow when determining 
whether to grant a waiver. The first five steps are mostly formalities, and 
the last five delve into the significance of the conflict and whether the 
conflict is “likely to affect the integrity of the services provided by that 
individual.”103 These guidelines appear to solidify the waiver rules 
 
 
DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ UCM341008.pdf. Perhaps the FDA believes it has successfully 
struck the correct balance, or perhaps the FDA feels it need not re-fuel a dying fire with any discussion 
of “balancing” interests as long as the public is not complaining about the status quo.  
 101. GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 37, at 7. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. The steps are:  
 Step 1—Is the Subject Matter of the Meeting a “Particular Matter?” . . . 
 Step 2—Will the particular matter have a direct and predictable effect on the financial 
interest(s) of any organization? . . . 
 Step 3—Identify Potentially Affected Products/Organizations and Request that the 
Employee Complete the Financial Disclosure Form. . . . 
 Step 4—Does the employee, or [those] whose interests are imputed to him, have a 
financial interest in [the] potentially affected products and/or organizations? . . . 
 Step 5—Will the Particular Matter Have a Direct and Predictable Effect on the Financial 
Interest of the Employee and/or [those] Whose Interests are Imputed to Him? . . . 
 Step 6—After Applying Applicable Regulatory Exemptions, Does the Employee or 
Persons/Organizations Whose Interests are Imputed to Him Have a Disqualifying Financial 
Interest? . . . 
 Step 7—Are There Disqualifying Financial Interests For Which a Waiver Would Not Be 
Considered? . . . 
 Step 8—Is the Combined Value of the Employee’s Personal Disqualifying Financial 
Interests and Those of His Spouse and Minor Children $50,000 or Less? . . . 
 Step 9—Is the Individual’s Participation Necessary to Afford the Advisory Committee 
Essential Expertise? . . . 
 Step 10(a)—If the Individual is a Special Government Employee, Does the Need for the 
Individual’s Services Outweigh the Potential for a Conflict of Interest Created by the 
Financial Interest Involved? . . . 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/8
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codified in 18 U.S.C. § 208. They create a single linear path by which 
waivers may be granted, and would seem to preclude many conflicted 
committee members from participating on advisory boards.
104
  
In sum, those with financial ties to the applicant for approval of a new 
drug or device must disclose this fact, and the FDA has significant 
discretion in choosing whether to waive the prohibition from the 
individual participating in the advisory committee meetings reviewing the 
product. The vast majority of its limitations are self-imposed. The next 
Section will address how the guidelines are actually implemented, the 
prevalence of conflicts and waivers, and how financial relationships affect 
market approval for drugs and devices.  
 
 
 Step 10(b)—If the Individual is a Regular Government Employee, Is the Financial 
Interest Not So Substantial as to be Deemed Likely to Affect the Integrity of the Services 
Provided by that Individual? . . . 
 Step 11—Waiver May Be Recommended If Consistent With Waiver Cap.  
Id. at 8–23. In 2012, the waiver cap was eliminated. An example of an issue that is not “a particular 
matter” may be a committee member training session on practices and procedures. If the issue is not a 
particular matter, all members may participate. If it is, the analysis proceeds to Step 2. 
 Step 6 is really where the waivers in 18 U.S.C. § 208 are implicated. The waiver guidelines up to 
this point are not more stringent; they are more linear (if more tedious). They have not weeded out any 
committee members through Step 5. At Step 6, staff members are instructed to consider exemptions 
listed in 5 C.F.R. 2640.202, such as relevant mutual funds, employee benefit plans, investment trusts, 
etcetera. Regarding Step 7, a waiver would not be granted to a special government employee who is 
the principal investigator of the particular matter to be discussed and is receiving or will receive 
compensation from its sponsor. Id. at 16. 
 Finally, Congress has eliminated the waiver cap since the issuance of these guidelines.  
 104. The Code of Federal Regulations also provides guidelines for granting waivers pursuant to 
section 208. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.401 states in part:  
Notwithstanding that his acquisition or holding of a particular interest is proper, an employee 
is prohibited in accordance with § 2635.402 of this subpart from participating in an official 
capacity in any particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he or any person whose interests 
are imputed to him has a financial interest, if the particular matter will have a direct and 
predictable effect on that interest.  
5 C.F.R. § 2635.401 (1997) (emphasis added). The final qualifier weakens the strength of the 
guidance, and opens the door to overlooking financial conflict justified by the fact that the 
particular matter may not have a “direct and predictable effect” on the committee member’s 
“interest.” 
 The statute provides a relevant example of a direct and predictable affect: A special government 
employee (“SGE”) whose principal employment is as a researcher at a university is appointed to serve  
on an advisory committee that has been convened to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the 
new kidney dialysis device developed by Alpha Medical under contract with the employee’s 
university. Alpha’s contract with the university requires the university to undertake additional 
testing of the device to address issues raised by the committee during its review. The 
committee’s actions will have a direct and predictable effect on the university’s financial 
interest. 
Id. 
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6. Practical Effect of the Rules: Pervasiveness of Committee Members 
with Waivers and Outcome-Determinative Votes by Waiver 
Grantees 
The financial disclosure requirements may appear sufficient to 
safeguard against advisory committee members voting with their own 
financial self-interest—rather than the public interest—in mind, and the 
FDA repeatedly and fervently argues that they do.
105
 For example, in 
1991, the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human 
Services submitted a management advisory report to the FDA discussing 
its failures regarding financial conflict of interest.
106
 The absence of a 
mechanism for collecting data on these conflicts among clinical 
investigators studying products undergoing FDA review, he argued, could 
constitute a “material weakness” under the Federal Managers’ Financial 
Integrity Act.
107
 The FDA ultimately created financial disclosure rules but 
denied any “material weakness.”108 
FDA spokesperson Morgan Liscinsky stated that the waiver rate has 
stayed below 5% in recent years.
109
 85% of waivers received were granted 
under 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(3) (allowing a waiver when the potential for 
conflict of interest is outweighed by the need for the individual’s 
services).
110
  
A study by Dr. Peter Lurie found that of 221 meetings held by sixteen 
advisory committees, 73% contained at least one financial conflict of 
interest, and only 1% of advisory committee members were recused.
111
 For 
 
 
 105. See, e.g., FDA, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (1998) (codified at 
21 C.F.R. § 54), available at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinical 
Trials/ucm119145. htm; FDA, Comment on “Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosure and Voting 
Patterns at Food and Drug Administration Drug Advisory Committee Meetings,” FDA.GOV (July 24, 
2006), http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/analysis.html (attempting to discredit the conclusions of Peter 
Lurie et al., Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosure and Voting Patterns at Food and Drug 
Administration Drug Advisory Committee Meetings, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 16 (2006), available at 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=202754#qundefined). Dr. Lurie’s study is a 
statistical analysis of the voting patterns of FDA committee members based on their financial ties to 
the products they voted to approve.  
 106. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, supra note 105.  
 107. Id. The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (“FMFIA”) requires federal agencies to 
submit an annual report on their internal control systems to protect against waste, abuse, and 
mismanagement, including any “material weakness.” Pub. L. No. 97-255, 96 Stat. 814 (1982) 
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012)). 
 108. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, supra note 105. 
 109. Alex Philippidis, FDA Backtracks on Conflict-of-Interest Rule Changes for Advisory Panel 
Members, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.genengnews. 
com/keywordsandtools/print/3/26290/. 
 110. ACKERLEY ET AL., supra note 29. 
 111. See Lurie et al., supra note 105. See also ACKERLEY ET AL., supra note 29 (measuring 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/8
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advisory committee members and voting consultants combined, 38% had a 
financial conflict of interest.
112
 Another independent study found that the 
median total dollar value of financial interest for members with waivers 
was $14,500.
113
 The study found no relationship between measures of 
expertise and the total dollar value of the financial conflict; those with 
waivers tend to have higher levels of expertise than those who do not.
114
 
Importantly, Lurie et al. also found that, despite these prevalent conflicts, 
“excluding advisory committee members and voting consultants with 
conflicts would not have altered the overall vote outcome at any meeting 
studied.”115 
However, even a waiver-free committee does not necessarily mean it is 
conflict-free. The FDA subjects disclosures to fairly rigorous scrutiny, but 
it considers a member conflicted, and therefore subject to scrutiny, only if 
the member’s conflict of interest occurred within the preceding twelve 
months.
116
 This is significantly lower than the conventional requirement 
for disclosure for scientific institutions and journals.
117
 This is what 
happened in the Bayer scandal; the members with financial ties to Bayer 
were deemed not to be conflicted because the transactions in question had 
occurred over a year prior to the committee meetings. Furthermore, 
conflicts are self-reported through disclosures; though the penalties for 
failing to disclose required information is fairly steep,
118
 such failures have 
occurred without penalty
119
 and it is not implausible that they still do. 
 
 
conflict of interest on FDA advisory committees, expertise, and whether expertise can be maintained 
without members with conflicts of interest). 
 112. Lurie et al., supra note 105. 
 113. See ACKERLEY ET AL., supra note 29, at 4–1.  
 114. Lurie et al., supra note 105. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Susan F. Wood & Jillian K. Mador, Uncapping Conflict of Interest?, 340 SCIENCE, no. 6137, 
at 1172 (2013); see also GoozNews (Merrill Goozner), Response Comment to A Theory on Why The 
FDA Hid Conflicts of Interest, GOOZNEWS (Jan. 16, 2012, 8:48 PM), http://gooznews.com/?p=3521 
(“I read [Ackerley et al.’s 2007] study closely. It found, based on published articles in the medical 
literature, that there were sufficient non-conflicted expertise available to staff FDA advisory 
committees, but that it would take extra work by the agency to identify and recruit them. In the last 
few years, the FDA has appointed far fewer conflicted scientists to its ACs than it did a decade ago. 
Why wasn’t that extra work put in [in the Yaz/Yasmin] case? [The] agency concluded that the 
conflicts were more than a year old and therefore did not requiring “waiving” or disclosing. However, 
when I specifically asked the agency about that, its p.r. spokeswoman dodged the question.”). 
 117. Wood & Mador, supra note 116, at 1172.  
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2012). See Janice Hopkins Tanne, Former FDA Head Is Fined $90 000 for 
Failing to Disclose Conflicts of Interest, 334 BRIT. MED. J., no. 7592, at 492 (2007).  
 119. See Letter from Anne Milgram, Attorney Gen. for the State of N.J., to Joshua M. Sharfstein, 
M.D., Acting Comm’r of the FDA (May 5, 2009), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/news 
releases09/050509-FDA-letter.pdf (“[D]espite the fact that Synthes’ failure to adequately disclose 
these interests should have been obvious from even a cursory review of its FDA submissions, the FDA 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Finally, the FDA is free to waive conflicts it considers de minimis and 
thus not likely to affect a committee member’s vote. Unfortunately, as 
intricate as FDA guidelines are, there is no set standard for what amount 
or percentage of net worth constitutes more than de minimis.
120
  
This Note does not suggest that conflicts of interest are frequently 
outcome determinative.
121
 It acknowledges to a small degree the 
legitimacy of the shared pool dilemma, and the tension between the public 
interest in approving a drug for the market in a timely manner and in 
meticulously scanning every committee member’s finances for evidence of 
bias. Rather, this Note suggests that the consequences of the few instances 
when the public has been harmed by a drug approved by a committee with 
one or more members with conflicts of interest are significant enough to 
warrant a more thorough examination of the factors weighed when 
determining the necessity that a person with financial interests in the drug 
to be reviewed contribute to the decision to approve it. 
This opinion is far from unanimous, and the next Part examines and 
critiques the arguments that the public is better served not by tightening 
FDA conflict of interest laws, but by loosening them. 
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS HARM PATIENTS, INDUSTRY, AND THE 
APPROVAL PROCESS 
Three main arguments have been set forth for loosening FDA conflict 
of interest laws. First, some feel that the restrictions of current laws do not 
serve the public because they delay patients’ access to treatment, 
particularly when patients have no viable alternative.
122
 Second, the 
burdens the current restrictions impose on the medical and pharmaceutical 
industries may hinder these industries’ competitiveness in a global market, 
 
 
did nothing to regulate these conflicts. A number of the disclosure forms were signed and dated, but 
were otherwise left blank. Others indicated that the clinical investigator had a significant equity 
interest in the product, but did not attach the requisite details. But the FDA approved Synthes’ 
applications for premarket approval without any delay or further inquiry into this issue.”). 
 120. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2) (2012); Goozner, supra note 116.  
 121. The evidence suggests that such financial conflicts have no statistically measurable effect on 
the outcome. Goozner, supra note 116. However, this does not mean conflicts are not playing a role in 
some decision-making, and when drugs are approved and ultimately end up harming the public, a 
conflicted panel was often behind the decision to approve the product. See, e.g., 10 On FDA Vioxx 
Panel Had Ties To Companies, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 25, 2005, 6:14 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/7031927/ns/health-arthritis/t/fda-vioxx-panel-had-ties-companies/#.UPslzyer-So.  
 122. Epstein, supra note 32.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/8
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where competitors do not face similar restrictions.
123
 Finally, Sharon 
Jacobs argues practically that the FDAAA, including its conflict of interest 
provisions, was reactionary legislation in response to the Vioxx scandal
124
 
and that its primary effect is little more than unnecessary red tape 
overburdening an already resource-strained agency.
125
 I will discuss each 
of these arguments in turn.  
A. Delaying Access to Treatment is Harmful to Patients 
In January 2013, an online petition circulated on Change.org urging the 
FDA to approve a drug for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy.
126
 The author 
is Jenn McNary, the mother of two sons, both of whom have the disease, 
but only one son was enrolled in a clinical trial of the drug treatment.
127
 
McNary wrote that her son being treated has improved to the point that he 
no longer needs a wheelchair, but her other son is steadily worsening, and 
will need a tracheotomy and a feeding tube if he does not receive the drug 
treatment soon.
128
 Every day, she watches the life-saving potential of 
earlier access to treatment and the devastating consequences of delay.  
McNary is not alone in her position. Though she does not address the 
reasons for a slow approval process, other patient groups point specifically 
at conflict of interest regulations as an unnecessary and harmful 
component of the approval process. On October 26, 2011, dozens of 
patient groups submitted a letter to Senators Tom Harkin and Michael 
 
 
 123. Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost Of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 10, 
2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-
inventing-new-drugs/. 
 124. Discussed infra Part III.  
 125. This much, at least, is true. Senator Ted Kennedy claimed that “the FDA gold standard” had 
been tarnished by the scandal. David Graham, Associate Director for Science and Medicine in the 
FDA’s Office of Drug Safety, stated that “today in 2004, we’re faced with what may be the single 
greatest drug safety catastrophe in the history of this country.” Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, 
and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food and Drug Legislation in the United States, 64 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599, 615 (2009) (citing The FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: 
Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong. 14 (2004) (testimony of David Graham)). 
 126. Jenn McNary, FDA: Please, Approve The Medicine My Boys Need To Survive—Both Of My 
Sons Deserve To Live, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/fda-please-approve-the-
medicine-my-boys-need-to-survive-both-of-my-sons-deserve-to-live (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
Change.org is an online petition platform that boasts of over twenty million users in 196 countries. 
http://www.change.org/about (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
 Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy is a type of muscular dystrophy that expresses itself only in males 
and progresses much more rapidly than most other types of muscular dystrophy. Duchenne Muscular 
Dystrophy, PUBMED HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001724/ (last 
updated Feb. 3, 2014).  
 127. McNary, supra note 126. 
 128. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Enzi, Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions, pleading with them to loosen the conflict 
of interest laws to which advisory committee members are subject.
129
 The 
letter explains, “our organizations promote efforts to bring better 
treatments and cures to those struggling with diseases. Many of these 
conditions have no adequate treatments and, therefore, it is imperative that 
we challenge hurdles that impede the quality and efficiency of the 
treatment development process.”130 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(3), again, provides 
a waiver for when the need for an individual’s services outweighs the 
potential for a conflict of interest. The letter explains that this exception is 
reasonable, balanced, and “recognizes that some potential SGE’s may 
come to the FDA with ties . . . that may pose some conflict of interest, but 
that the primary issue must be the government’s need for their services.”131 
Law professor Richard Epstein states that complaints like these “have 
come primarily from patients groups representing the users and consumers 
of pharmaceutical products, for whom new drugs and devices often spell 
the difference between life and death,” not from industry.132  
Janet Woodcock, the director of the FDA’s drug center, also expresses 
concern about the procedural burdens of conflict of interest laws. She 
testified that the restrictions have slowed the advisory committee process, 
and that sometimes the FDA will discover a tie to a pharmaceutical 
company only at the end of a long process of searching for experts,
133
 and 
then the agency is forced to start anew.
134
 Marc Boutin, executive vice 
 
 
 129. Letter to Senators Tom Harkin and Michael Enzi, Members of the Cong. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor, & Pensions (Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www.rarediseases.org/docs/policy/ 
HELPLetter_102011Senate.pdf.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Epstein, supra note 32.  
 133. This is curious given that potential committee members are legally required to disclose these 
ties themselves.  
 134. PDUFA Hearing, supra note 35. Janet Woodcock, one should note, is not free from 
accusations of conflict influencing her decisions. In 2009, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc., 
complained that it had been delayed in a “six-year effort to win approval for a generic version of 
Lovenox, a multi-billion-dollar blood thinner.” Alicia Mundy, Drug Chief at the FDA Is Accused Of 
Conflict, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125003545637 
224263.html. “Dr. Woodcock co-authored a scientific paper with scientists at Momenta 
Pharmaceuticals Inc.,” a competitor pharmaceutical company, “while both companies were battling to 
win FDA approval of their generic blood thinners.” Id. The article identified the cause of over 100 
deaths due to a Chinese-imported heparin; Momenta’s stock jumped 17% in a single day. Amphastar 
pointed to emails between Woodcock and one of Momenta’s founders and a medical conference the 
two attended together in Thailand in 2007. Id. Dr. Woodcock at first refused to recuse herself from the 
approval decisions of both companies’ drugs, but later did, after which the FDA determined that no 
conflict of interest existed. Ed Silverman, No Conflict of Interest For FDA’s Woodcock, PHARMALOT 
(Feb. 5, 2010, 8:00 AM), archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20110724045252/http://www. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/8
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president of the National Health Council, testified that the organization is 
“deeply concerned that the challenges in identifying experts for advisory 
committees are leading to delays in patient access to new treatments.”135 
He notes that the FDA itself wrote that “optimal representation is often 
difficult to achieve given the strict conflict-of-interest regulations that 
apply . . . .”136 Boutin and other advocates for less burdensome regulations 
argue that many patients’ needs for currently unavailable treatments 
outweighs the need for an advisory committee to be absolutely dissociated 
from the product it evaluates.
137
 
The harm to patients caused by the delay in market approval is obvious 
with respect to access to treatment, but Thomas Philipson and Eric Sun 
argue that such delays have economic costs to patients as well.
138
 These 
costs reach the patients in two major ways. First, lack of access to the most 
effective treatment may result in lost wages due to absenteeism (or 
sometimes, death).
139
 The second way is more indirect; Philipson and Sun 
contend that shorter trial phases and speedier reviews will save trial 
sponsors money, which will help underwrite the costs of producing and 
marketing the next generation’s drugs.140 They estimated the effects of 
 
 
pharmalot.com/2010/02/no-conflict-of-interest-for-fdas-woodcock/ (blog no longer active, original 
text on file with author).  
 135. Testimony of Marc Boutin, Exec. Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, Nat’l Health 
Council Before the House Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Health: PDUFA V: Medical 
Innovations, Jobs, and Patients, at 8 (July 7, 2011), available at http://democrats.energycommerce. 
house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/Testimony_HE_07.07.11_Boutin.pdf. 
 136. Id. at 9.  
 137. Id. Boutin in his testimony advocated for the fifth reauthorization of the Prescription Drug 
Fee User Act (“PDUFA”), which allows drug manufacturers to pay the FDA a fee in exchange for an 
expedited approval process. The President signed this Act into law on July 9, 2012 as part of the Food 
and Drug Safety and Innovation Act. PDUFA V: Fiscal Years 2013—2017, FDA.GOV 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm272170.htm (last updated 
Dec. 26, 2013). 
 138. THOMAS J. PHILIPSON & ERIC SUN, COST OF CAUTION: THE IMPACT ON PATIENTS OF 
DELAYED DRUG APPROVALS, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y RES. (2010), available at http://www. 
manhattan-institute.org/pdf/fda_02.pdf. 
 139. Id. at 4–5. 
 140. Id. at 2.  In general, a drug must be tried in three “phases” before the FDA will approve it 
for market use and one postmarket phase. Phase I is the first time a drug is administered to a human 
being. Phase I studies are meant to determine the safety of a drug, how it is metabolized and excreted, 
and safe dosage. They do not measure effectiveness. They generally consist of twenty to eighty 
subjects, usually healthy volunteers, and drugs are administered at sub-therapeutic levels. A drug will 
proceed beyond Phase I only if Phase I studies do not reveal “unacceptable toxicity.” Phase II studies 
measure effectiveness and continue to identify safety issues. Drugs are administered at therapeutic 
levels against a control group; the number of subjects usually ranges from a few dozen to 300. In 
Phase III, treatment is given to more subjects (1000—3000) to confirm the drug’s effectiveness, 
monitor side effects, and compare it to currently available treatments. At this point the FDA may 
approve the drug, require more testing, or reject it. Phase IV, the final phase, is primarily a polishing 
phase; postmarketing studies obtain additional information, such as the treatment’s risks, benefits, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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releasing three drugs to patients one and three years earlier. For example, a 
year’s earlier access to a certain antiretroviral treatment for patients with 
AIDS would be worth $16,000.
141
 The value of three years’ earlier access 
would be $46,000. For the entire cohort of patients with AIDS that would 
seek such treatment, “the value of one year’s earlier access would be $19 
billion. The value of three years’ earlier access would be $53 billion.”142 
Philipson and Sun note that while certainly drug companies also benefit 
from speedier market approval, the benefit is not as great as that which 
patients would receive, either proportionally or in absolute terms.
143
 They 
quantify the arguments of other proponents of a more streamlined review 
process, and affirm the idea that patients’ interests, in terms of quality and 
quantity of life as well as economics, lie in faster market approval.
144
 
B. Delaying Market Approval Hinders Economic Competitiveness 
While the FDA’s mission statement with respect to drugs is simply to 
ensure their safety and effectiveness,
145
 others, including many in 
Congress, consider the FDA’s mission much more sweeping. These 
 
 
optimal use. The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FDA.GOV, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last updated May 28, 2014). 
Phase 0 trials now exist as well, created in response to the FDA’s Investigational New Drug (“IND”) 
guidance. Phase 0 Trials are non-therapeutic and are meant as a weed-out process of unsafe or clearly 
ineffective drugs, administered for brief durations and at sub-therapeutic levels. They are not widely 
utilized at this point. Shivaani Kummar et al., Phase 0 Clinical Trials: Conceptions and 
Misconceptions, 14 CANCER J., no. 3, at 133–37 (2008). 
 141. PHILIPSON & SUN, supra note 138, at 5.  
 142. Id.  
 143. They also thoroughly stress the study’s limitations. They focused on three drugs widely 
known to be safe and highly effective, while of course drugs being tested for market approval may still 
be marked by precarious unknowns. In other words, the risk-benefit analysis yields favorable results 
when the risks are low and the benefits are high. These variables are far less certain for drugs still 
being tested in clinical trials, and that is precisely the point of clinical trials followed by a thorough 
review process.  
 144. Concededly, Philipson and Sun do not discuss conflicts of interest in the approval process as 
a cause for delay in approval. Clinical trials, which can last up to twelve years, and the scarcity of trial 
subjects certainly hinder access to treatment more than the delay caused by determining an acceptable 
panel of experts. That said, the authors’ ultimate point–that delays in the approval process hinders 
patients’ much-needed access to treatment–is perfectly consistent with and supports the argument for 
loosening conflict-of-interest regulation on the same justification. Moreover, Philipson and Sun’s 
study was part of the Manhattan Institute’s Project FDA, and the program’s mission statement 
specifically mentions conflict rules as one of the burdens of FDA effectiveness. PHILIPSON & SUN, 
supra note 138, at 18 (“Unfortunately, in our zeal to reduce risks, regulate potential conflicts, and 
mandate transparency, we may reduce incentives for companies to develop and market improved 
products . . . ; inhibit doctors from collaborating with companies in designing safer and more effective 
products; and slow the FDA’s efforts to bring its oversight activities into conformity with the latest 
scientific and technical advances.”). 
 145. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
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advocates for less stringent regulation also argue that FDA conflict of 
interest laws render the United States less competitive in medical and 
pharmaceutical industries.
146
  
Colorado U.S. Senator Michael Bennet wrote to FDA commissioner 
Margaret Hamburg expressing a desire to reform FDA regulations to put 
the FDA in a position to foster innovation and “serve as a driver of the 
global economy.”147 “I believe we have an opportunity to do good things 
for patients and a critical sector of the U.S. economy,” Bennet wrote.148 In 
2011, Bennet, along with Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Richard Burr (R-
NC), cosponsored the Medical Device Regulatory Improvement Act in 
2011, which would “restore the appropriate balance to conflicts of interest 
requirements by requiring the FDA [medical device committees] to be 
subject to the same conflicts of interest requirements as the rest of the 
federal government.”149 This sentiment suggests a much bolder purpose 
for the FDA, specifically that it should actively facilitate growth of the 
U.S. and global economy, rather than merely ensure that food and drugs 
are safe and effective. In other words, the FDA should be concerned for 
the economic interests of drug and device manufacturers.  
The cost of inventing a drug and getting it approved for market use is 
disputed, but advocates for a faster approval time estimate that it is 
extremely and unnecessarily costly.
150
 Matthew Herper asserts that the 
average cost of developing a drug is $4 billion and can reach up to $11 
billion.
151
 He clarifies that the more commonly used figure, $1 billion to 
 
 
 146. See, e.g., Thomas Sullivan, Medical Device Regulatory Improvement Act Introduced: 
Senators Call for Reducing Arbitrary Conflict of Interest Quotas on FDA Panels, POL’Y & MED. (Oct. 
14, 2011, 12:12 PM), http://www.policymed.com/2011/10/medical-device-regulatory-improvement-
act-introduced-senators-call-for-reducing-arbitrary-conflict-o.html.  
 147. Press Release, Michael F. Bennet, Bennet Urges FDA to Work to Foster Innovation, Drive 
Global Economy (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.bennet.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=388b 
128b-7cab-40d6-8124-c527dca0d055 (full text of letter within Press Release).  
 148. Id.  
 149. Sullivan, supra note 146; S. 1700, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011), available at http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s1700is/pdf/BILLS-112s1700is.pdf. The bill has been referred to the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. S.1700—Medical Device Regulatory 
Improvement Act, CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/1700/ 
actions (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).  
 Ed Silverman, reporting on the bill for Pharmalot (a healthcare regulation blog that has since been 
deleted), points out that Senator Klobuchar received campaign donations from Medtronic, and Senator 
Burr received contributions from multiple drug and device manufacturers, including Pfizer, Merck, 
GlaxoSmithKline and Medtronic. Ed Silverman, What Vacancies? FDA Conflict Rules & Advisory 
Panels, PHARMALOT (Nov. 30, 2011, 8:23 AM), archived at https://web.archive.org/web/201 
21103191406/http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/11/what-vacancies-fda-conflict-rules-advisory-panels/ 
(blog no longer active, original text on file with author).  
 150. Herper, supra note 123. 
 151. Id.  
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$1.3 billion, is the cost of bringing the particular drug to market, but his 
figure is a more accurate representation of pharmaceutical companies’ 
costs because it accounts for the fact that most drugs developed are not 
approved, and that “$4 billion in research dollars spent for every drug that 
is approved.”152 For those who feel that the FDA should consider the 
interests of the industry and the U.S. economy, relaxing conflict of interest 
rules—assuming, as these individuals like Mr. Epstein do, that such 
relaxation would not result in a detriment to patient safety—only makes 
sense.  
C. Conflict Regulation Unnecessarily Burdens the FDA, Which Harms 
Industry and Patients 
Diane Dorman, the Vice President for Public Policy of the National 
Organization for Rare Disorders, explained that current FDA conflict of 
interest laws “have resulted in a system that is out of balance to the point 
that conflict avoidance is the primary driver of who serves on Advisory 
Committees, regardless of the extent of the conflict, the uniqueness of 
their expertise, or the government’s need for their services.”153 Michael 
Boutin has stated that “efforts to maintain the public’s trust may now be 
superseding the need to secure necessary expertise to the detriment of the 
advisory committee process as a whole.”154 He also contends that “late 
recusals from an advisory committee due to a conflict of interest have led 
to a meeting cancellation and a delay in the FDA’s approval of the 
application.”155  
The more resources the FDA expends on a single drug or approval 
process, the less it has to spend on other tasks. In 2011, Congress 
increased FDA funding by nearly 3% to a mere $3.8 billion per year.
156
 
Many argue the FDA could carry out its mission more effectively with less 
unnecessary red tape.
157
 When the FDA’s already limited resources are 
 
 
 152. Id.  
 153. Testimony of Diane Edquist Dorman, Vice President, Public Policy, National Organization 
for Rare Disorders (“NORD”) Before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce Subcomm. on Health (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://democrats.energycommerce. 
house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/Testimony_HE_02.01.12_Dorman.pdf.  
 154. Boutin, supra note 135, at 7. 
 155. Id. at 8. 
 156. Dina ElBoghdady, FDA Funding Boosted Through Lobbying Effort, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/fda-funding-boosted-through-lobbying-effort/ 
2011/11/23/gIQAXHQ6CO_story.html. In light of the fact that the FDA regulates 25% of every dollar 
spent in the United States, $3.8 billion seems unreasonably small. Harris, supra note 16. 
 157. See, e.g., Barton Urges FDA To Cut Red Tape That Hurts Health Care And Stifles 
Innovation, PHARMACY CHOICE (July 20, 2011), http://www.pharmacychoice.com/news/article. 
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strained, delays in the approval process “at times creates acrimonious 
litigation between the FDA and innovators, not to mention disillusionment 
among desperate patients.”158 
Epstein echoes these sentiments in more colorful, even accusatory 
language: “current FDA conflict of interest rules regard doctors and 
scientists with any financial connections with drug and device 
manufacturers as corrupt shills, who should be banished from its sacred 
precincts.”159 He implies that the current regulations are insulting to 
healthcare professionals and states that “[a]ny conflict of interest rule must 
. . . preserve the FDA’s broad access to a large pool of the most qualified 
scientists. Disqualification should be done on a case by case basis, upon 
proof of specific concerns, not by broad decrees.”160  
Former FDA commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach and law professor 
Ralph Hall also blame FDA inefficiencies on “a decades-old regulatory 
process that is outmoded and needlessly long.”161 They detail three areas 
 
 
cfm?Article_ID=754627. Representative Joe Barton (R-Ennis/Arlington), Chairman Emeritus and 
senior Republican on the Energy and Commerce Committee, stated that “[r]egulations have 
consequences and the benefits should outweigh the costs. This hearing exposes the problems 
associated with unnecessary red-tape and it is time the leadership at the FDA did something to fix it. If 
they are unwilling to do so, they should be replaced.” Id.  
 Representative Barton’s comments are curious given that Congress has at least as much power to 
correct over-regulation as the agency. Moreover, many feel that the FDA is critically underfunded. A 
former commissioner of the FDA explains, “Congress has starved the agency of critical funding, 
limiting its scientists’ ability to keep up with peers in private industry and academia.” Andrew von 
Eschenbach, Toward a 21st-Century FDA, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://online. 
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577331673917964962.html (subscription required). 
One of the results, von Eschenbach explains, is a slower drug and device approval process. Id. 
Notably, Representative Barton voted against increasing funding to the FDA. HR 2112—
Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, and the Food and Drug Administration—Key 
Vote, PROJECT VOTE SMART, http://votesmart.org/bill/13994/37381/27082/appropriations-for-
agriculture-rural-development-and-the-food-and-drug-administration#.UPHHXG_NaSp (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2014).  
 158. Von Eschenbach, supra note 157. 
 159. Epstein, supra note 32.  
 160. Id. A strong argument could be made that a bright-line rule lends itself to abuse less than 
granting waivers at the discretion of a committee or administrator, but Epstein’s point is that 
committee members do not abuse their positions.  
 161. Andrew von Eschenbach & Ralph Hall, FDA Approvals Are a Matter of Life and Death, 
WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2012, 7:13 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303753 
904577454163076760768.html (subscription required). The authors also suggest that the FDA’s 
approval process is tedious and lags behind federal drug agencies in Europe and Canada. This once 
widely-held belief has been heavily contested and arguably debunked. See, e.g., Karen N. Peart, In 
Drug-Approval Race, U.S. FDA Ahead of Canada, Europe, YALE NEWS (May 16, 2012), 
http://news.yale.edu/2012/05/16/drug-approval-race-us-fda-ahead-canada-europe. The median time 
between submission and approval was 322 days at the FDA, 366 days at the European Medicines 
Agency, and 409 days at Health Canada. Joseph Ross, an author of the study, discusses the study and 
its implications in More Proof FDA is Faster than Other Drug Regulators, FORBES (June 19, 2012, 
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for improvement in the regulatory scheme for the premarket approval 
process that would serve patients, industry, and the FDA itself. First, they 
advise creation of alternatives to clinical trials; second, increased and 
better quality postmarket surveillance, which would remove some of the 
imperative that the FDA be positive of the correct decision upon approval; 
and third, collaboration with stakeholders.
162
 They believe that 
collaboration, not severing contact, with experts simply because they have 
financial stakes in a product’s approval, will lead to better patient care and 
better economic outcomes.  
None of these advocates for loosening conflict of interest regulations 
propose to do so at the expense of patient safety; rather, they believe the 
regulations are overly burdensome to both industry and to the FDA, and 
harm patients more than help them.  
IV. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE 
PUBLIC, AND THIS INTEREST OUTWEIGHS THE BURDENS CONFLICT 
REGULATION IMPOSES ON INDUSTRY AND THE FDA 
Advocates for strengthening conflict of interest laws come out 
swinging just as hard as their opposition, and their arguments are at least 
as cogent. First, they point to incidents of products being approved by a 
conflicted committee that ultimately harms the public as evidence of 
ineffectively screening members that affect the integrity of the approval 
process. A second argument is one to which industry might be receptive; 
conflict waivers can work against industry’s interests, such as when 
committee members’ conflicts stem from associations to competitor 
companies. Third, advocates for maintaining conflict regulations say that 
industry’s estimated costs of developing a drug are greatly overstated (and 
even if they are not, their profits dwarf these costs). Fourth, they argue that 
the “shared pool dilemma” does not actually exist, but that experts exist in 
sufficient numbers to satisfy the vacancies on FDA committees. I will 
discuss each of these arguments in turn. Finally, I suggest that patient 
groups’ “last hope” argument to make drugs meant to treat life-threatening 
conditions more readily available is a grave risk, because it opens doors 
for pharmaceutical companies to take advantage of patients with these 
conditions and their families.  
 
 
10:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/06/19/more-proof-fda-is-faster-than-
other-regulators/ (guest post by Joseph Ross).  
 162. Von Eschenbach & Hall, supra note 161.  
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A. Committees with Conflicts Have Approved Drugs That Have or Could 
Have Harmed the Public 
This Section describes past committee meetings with conflicted 
members that approved drugs that may have harmed the public. While the 
following cases of dangerous drugs being approved and re-approved by 
committees with conflicts of interest is not direct evidence that the 
conflicts were outcome-determinative, it is important to consider that the 
presence of conflicted members can influence other members’ votes. 
Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Research Center for Women 
& Families, argues both from personal experience and from a study she 
conducted, that a strong sway toward committee approval occurs when 
conflicted members are present. “Our study indicates that even one 
committee member with a financial conflict of interest could easily 
influence the votes of the entire committee,” she said.163 She stated: 
I’ve seen how members with financial ties to the company or 
product often talk more at the meetings. They may talk more 
because they know more[, or] because they want to show the 
company how smart or helpful they are. Whatever the reason, their 
greater participation can be influential. Many advisory committee 
members ask no questions and make no comments at these 
meetings, until required to explain their votes. The advisory 
committee members with more direct knowledge of the products, 
including those with financial ties to the company or the product 
can greatly influence the vote when they talk more, ask softball 
questions or steer the conversation toward topics of benefit to the 
company.
164
 
It is with this understanding the following cases should be considered.  
 
 
 163. Peter Mansell, Are US Advisory Committees a Pushover? PHARMATIMES (Sept. 1, 2006), 
http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/06-09-01/Are_US_advisory_committees_a_pushover.aspx?rl=1 
&rlurl=/06-11-15/Debate_on_industry_influence_rumbles_on.aspx.  
 164. Diana Zuckerman, FDA Panels: Too Many Conflicts Or Too Little Expertise?, CANCER 
PREVENTION & TREATMENT FUND (June 12, 2013), http://www.stopcancerfund.org/in-the-news/ 
press-releases/fdapanels-too-many-conflicts-or-too-little-expertise/.  
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1. The Rezulin Scandal 
The FDA’s approval and subsequent withdrawal of Rezulin was one of 
the first major public relations crises for the agency.
165
 “Rezulin was the 
first of a new class of drugs designed to treat Type II . . . diabetes,” and its 
manufacturer, Warner-Lambert, highly marketed the drug to physicians 
and the public even before its trial data were submitted to the FDA for the 
approval process, paying over 300 doctors to spread the word about the 
new treatment.
166
 “The Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs advisory 
committee unanimously recommended that the drug be approved.”167 The 
FDA granted “fast-track” approval in January 1997168 despite explicit 
warnings of the danger of liver toxicity.
169
 
By the fall of 1997, however, the agency had received numerous 
reports that the drug was causing liver failure among patients, with 
four confirmed deaths. Working with Warner-Lambert, FDA issued 
new labels recommending that patients taking Rezulin have their 
liver functions monitored every two to three months. In December 
1997, British authorities withdrew the drug from the U.K. market 
following six deaths linked to Rezulin. FDA again modified its 
labeling to require monthly monitoring of liver function. After 
reports of at least thirty-one fatalities attributable to Rezulin usage, 
[FDA] Commissioner Jane Henney [reconvened] the advisory 
committee to again evaluate the drug’s safety.170 
Four of twelve of the committee members were granted waivers, including 
two members newly appointed to the committee on the eve of the meeting: 
Dr. Mayer B. Davidson and Dr. Saul M. Genuth.
171
 Both of these men had 
received income in the preceding two years “as leaders of a private 
diabetes education group funded exclusively by the makers of Rezulin.”172 
The grounds for the waivers were not made public.
173
 After The Los 
 
 
 165. Glodé, supra note 30, at 308.  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  
 168. David Willman, FDA’s Approval and Delay in Withdrawing Rezulin Probed, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/aug/16/news/mn-5139.  
 169. David Willman, 2 New FDA Panelists Have Ties to Rezulin Maker, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25, 
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/mar/25/news/mn-20841 [hereinafter Ties to Rezulin].  
 170. Glodé, supra note 30, at 308–09.  
 171. David Willman, FDA Advised to Restrict Rezulin Use for Diabetes, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/mar/27/news/mn-21447/2 [hereinafter FDA Advised].  
 172. Willman, Ties to Rezulin, supra note 169.  
 173. Willman, FDA Advised, supra note 171.  
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Angeles Times revealed these financial ties, Davidson recused himself 
from participating, but the other three members with conflicts did not.
174
 
The committee recommended by a vote of 8-4 that Rezulin remain on the 
market.
175
 By March of 2000, “FDA had ninety reports of patient liver 
failure among patients taking Rezulin; in sixty-three of these cases, the 
patients died.”176 The agency finally asked Warner-Lambert to withdraw 
the drug from the market, and the company agreed.
177
  
2. The Vioxx Scandal 
FDA safety researcher David Graham estimates that the anti-
inflammatory drug Vioxx caused 140,000 cases of serious heart disease
178
 
and up to 60,000 deaths between 1999 and 2004, when Merck, its 
manufacturer, voluntarily pulled it from the market.
179
 In February 2005, 
an FDA advisory committee voted 17–15 to allow the drug to return to the 
market.
180
 Ten of the thirty-two committee members had financial ties to 
either Pfizer or Merck (the committee also voted on Pfizer’s drug 
Celebrex, similar to Vioxx).
181
 Nine of the ten voted for re-introduction of 
the drugs.
182
 
While the FDA was apparently unaware of Vioxx’s risks in its original 
approval
183
 (because Merck submitted to the FDA fabricated data 
 
 
 174. Glodé, supra note 30, at 309. 
 175. Willman, FDA Advised, supra note 171. It is also worth noting that nine of the ten physicians 
who presented on the effectiveness and safety of the drug were paid Warner-Lambert consultants. See 
JEROME P. KASSIRER, M.D., ON THE TAKE: HOW MEDICINE’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN 
ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 48 (2005). Further, the top diabetes researcher at the National Institutes of 
Health (which oversees the FDA) was paid $78,455 by Warner-Lambert between 1995 and 1997. 
Willman, Ties to Rezulin, supra note 169. The FDA has been strengthening its conflict of interest 
regulation for researchers and trials in parallel with its regulation for advisory committee members. 
See, e.g., GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (2013), supra note 100..  
 176. Glodé, supra note 30, at 309.  
 177. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Rezeulin to be Withdrawn from the 
Market (Mar. 21, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/backgrd/3634b1a_ 
tab6c.htm.  
 178. Daniel Carlat, Diagnosis: Conflict of Interest, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/opinion/13carlat.html?_r=0.  
 179. Matthew Herper, David Graham on the Vioxx Verdict, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2005, 6:31 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/19/merck-vioxx-graham_cx_mh_0819graham.html.  
 180. 10 On FDA Vioxx Panel Had Ties To Companies, supra note 121. 
 181. Id.; Conflicts of Interest on COX-2 Panel, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST (Feb. 25, 
2005), http://www.cspinet.org/new/200502251.html.  
 182. 10 On FDA Vioxx Panel Had Ties To Companies, supra note 121.  
 183. Rita Rubin, How Did Vioxx Debacle Happen?, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2004), http://usa 
today30.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm. 
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appearing to augment the drug’s analgesic effects184 and attempted to 
obfuscate serious adverse events
185
), the FDA knew Vioxx’s risks as early 
as 2000.
186
 In September 2001, the FDA wrote Merck’s CEO, stating: 
“Your promotional campaign discounts the fact that in [your own] study, 
patients on Vioxx were observed to have a four to five fold increase in 
myocardial infarctions (MIs) compared to patients on the comparator non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drug . . . .”187 And yet, ten committee members 
voted to reintroduce Vioxx on the market. Given that Vioxx generated 
$2.5 billion in the year preceding its pull from the market,
188
 some believe 
that this vote demonstrated that when given the chance, conflicted experts 
will consciously or otherwise risk lives for their own financial interest.
189
 
3. The Yaz/Yasmin Scandal 
Though Vioxx has certainly caused more harm to the public, the 
Yaz/Yasmin scandal perhaps better demonstrates the depths of what 
consumer advocates see as rife corruption within the FDA because of the 
many ways conflicts impacted the approval process. Not only did five 
participating committee members have financial interests in the 
decision,
190
 but Dr. Wolfe was precluded from participating because of an 
“intellectual conflict of interest,”191 and an expert report warning of the 
drugs’ serious safety risks was excluded from consideration because “the 
date to submit documents had passed.”192 Finally, as stated earlier, the 
FDA did not issue any waivers to committee members because their 
conflicts arose over a year earlier. This interpretation of financial conflict 
of interest is dubious.  
 
 
 184. Keith J. Winstein & David Armstrong, Top Pain Scientist Fabricated Data in Studies, 
Hospital Says, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1236725 
10903888207.html. 
 185. SHARI L. TARGUM, REVIEW OF CARDIOVASCULAR SAFETY DATABASE 34 (2001), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3677b2_06_cardio.pdf. 
 186. Rubin, supra note 183. 
 187. Letter from the FDA to Raymond V. Gilmartin, Merck CEO (Sept. 17, 2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivi
tiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM166383.pdf.  
 188. Merck to Begin Paying $4.85B in Vioxx Settlements, NJ.COM (July 17, 2008, 3:04 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/07/merck_to_begin_paying_485b_in.html.  
 189. See generally Justin Biddle, Lessons from the Vioxx Debacle: What the Privatization of 
Science Can Teach Us About Social Epistemology, 21 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 1, Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 31.  
 190. Lenzer & Epstein, supra note 3. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
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In this incident, the depths of conflict reached the chair of the 
committee, Julia Johnson. Johnson had conducted clinical trials on behalf 
of Bayer. Another committee member, Paula Hillard, was a paid 
consultant to Bayer.
193
 Elizabeth Raymond, another committee member, 
conducted clinical trials sponsored by Barr, which has a licensing 
agreement with Bayer. Committee member Anne Burke received research 
funding from Bayer. A fifth advisor received consulting fees from a law 
firm representing Bayer.
194
 FDA spokeswoman Morgan Liscinsky 
confirmed that no waivers were issued to committee members.
195
 This fact 
raises the issue of waivers. As explained above, the FDA has issued 
progressively fewer waivers in recent years,
196
 which it touts as a 
minimization of conflicted committee members. This incident suggests, 
quite the contrary, that participation of conflicted members may be as high 
as ever, but that the FDA either deliberately or negligently fails to 
formally recognize this by issuing a waiver.  
In addition, the advisory committee decided not to consider a 196-page 
report by former FDA Commissioner David Kessler “prepared for 
attorneys suing Bayer on behalf of the more than 10,000 women who 
claim to have been harmed by the drug” because the report was submitted 
too late.
197
 This may suggest that the advisory committee was deliberately 
 
 
 193. The voting members are required to state for the record why they voted as they did. 
Interestingly, Dr. Hillard voted “yes” because the risk of blood clots associated with taking the drug 
were less than the risk of blood clots for pregnant persons. In fact, the committee member who spoke 
before Dr. Hillard explained this rationale, and Dr. Hillard said “Ditto.” They apparently would not 
consider the risk of blood clots compared to the risk for non-pregnant persons and persons taking other 
forms of oral contraceptives. FDA CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, JOINT MEETING OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH DRUGS AND THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 403 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/ReproductiveHealthDrugsAdvisoryCommit 
tee/UCM288721.pdf.  
 The risk of blood clots with Yaz and Yasmin, as stated earlier, is approximately tenfold that 
associated with other forms of oral contraceptives. Lenzer & Epstein, supra note 3. Dr. Johnson voted 
“yes” because she did not “think the data is sufficient, with the current studies, to be able to say that 
there is a risk.” Id. at 406. Dr. Burke voted “yes,” stating “while I acknowledge that there does seem to 
be a moderate increased risk, it’s still lower than the risks of pregnancy.” Id. at 413. Dr. Raymond 
voted “yes” because “[o]ral contraceptives prevent pregnancy and many other serious health 
conditions, and these effects clearly outweigh the relatively low risk of venous thromboembolism.” Id. 
(Bayer was at this time under investigation for illegally promoting off-label uses for Yaz and Yasmin. 
Jef Feeley & Margaret Cronin Fisk, Bayer May Have Pitched Birth-Control Pill for Unapproved Use, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 21, 2011, 7:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-21/bayer-
may-have-touted-birth-control-pills-for-unapproved-use-e-mails-show.html.)  
 194. Lenzer & Epstein, supra note 3.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Percent Granted Waivers, supra note 95. 
 197. The Latest Advisory Committee Stumbles at FDA, GOOZNEWS (Dec. 7, 2011), http://gooz 
news.com/?p=3421.  
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resisting voices that opposed the drug’s approval and the information that 
supported them.
198
 Dr. Kessler’s report detailed the dangers of 
drospirenone, the synthetic hormone in Yaz and Yasmin, and accused 
Bayer of deliberately withholding from the FDA data demonstrating the 
dangers of the hormone.
199
 Though of course Kessler’s report could be 
considered not objective because it was prepared for plaintiff’s attorneys, 
certainly the perspectives of pharmaceutical companies are equally biased.  
The FDA explained its exclusion of Dr. Kessler’s report on the dangers 
of drospirenone as a procedural bar. This may well be true, but this 
committee systematically eliminated the opinions of two experts
200
 that 
both warned of the serious safety risks associated with the hormone in Yaz 
and Yasmin. Dr. Kessler’s report was previously under seal and released 
to the FDA for consideration upon its unsealing. If the committee’s only 
purpose was to determine the safety of the drug, some wonder, why not 
consider all the available evidence, especially evidence suggesting the 
drug poses a life-threatening danger?
201
 These factors suggest to advocates 
for greater oversight that the FDA’s lax approach to conflicts of interest is 
harming the public.  
B. Conflict Waivers Can Work Against Industry and the Approval Process 
The drug industry often assumes that conflict of interest regulation in 
the approval process is necessarily harmful to the industry.
202
 However, 
the inverse of this assertion, that less regulation is beneficial to the 
industry, is not always true. It depends on the players in the industry being 
 
 
 198. Dr. Kessler’s report is available at http://gooznews.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ 
20111207-DavidKessler-court-brief-on-safety-of-Yasmin-from-Bayer.pdf. 
 199. Former FDA Commish: Bayer Hid Yasmin Data, EXPERT BRIEFINGS (Dec. 6, 2011, 2:13 
PM), http://www.expertbriefings.com/news/former-fda-commish-bayer-hid-yasmin-data/.  
 200.  Dr. Kessler was a former FDA commissioner, and in 2009 Dr. Wolfe was appointed to a 
four-year term on the FDA’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Committee. Philip J. Hilts, Clinton 
Retains Bush Appointee as F.D.A. Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 1993), available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/1993/02/27/us/clinton-retains-bush-appointee-as-fda-chief.html. Alicia Mundy, A Wolfe 
in Regulator’s Clothing: Drug Industry Critic Joins the FDA, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123145489435265929.html.  
 201. See, e.g., Margaret Cronin Fisk & Jef Feeley, Bayer Withheld Yasmin Data From U.S., 
Former Agency Chief Tells Court, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 5, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-05/bayer-withheld-yasmin-clot-risk-data-from-u-s-ex-agency-head-tells 
-court.html.  
 202. See, e.g., Andrew Entzminger, Medical Panel Rules Called Too Restrictive, WASHINGTON 
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/3/report-fdas-
conflict-interest-rules-too-restrictiv/; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MANHATTAN INST., HOW CONFLICT-OF-
INTEREST RULES ENDANGER MEDICAL PROGRESS AND CURES (2010), available at http://www. 
manhattan-institute.org/pdf/fda_03.pdf.  
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implicated. In the spring of 2007, an FDA advisory committee approved 
the prostate cancer treatment drug Provenge (manufactured by Dendreon) 
by a vote of 13–4.203 Two of the panelists who voted against the drug, 
Howard Scher and Maha Hussain, “quietly wrote FDA officials to veto 
[the] panel recommendation”204 because there was no solid evidence that 
Provenge slowed the progression of the disease, extending a patient’s life 
by four months.
205
 Both panelists who wrote had ties to other drug 
manufacturers making competitor prostate cancer drugs, Dr. Scher being 
the lead investigator for another manufacturer’s prostate cancer drug.206 
The FDA declined to approve the drug, and Dendreon’s stock plummeted 
over 60% within a day.
207
 Provenge was not approved until April of 
2010,
208
 and its stock, after an initial boom upon approval, has stagnated 
due to the fact that competing treatments were available by the time it was 
approved.
209
 Additionally, a patient group filed suit against the FDA and 
some of its officials for the delay, most of which was summarily dismissed 
on grounds of ripeness, finality, and sovereign immunity.
210
 Patients and 
their advocates threatened Scher and Hussain to the extent that they 
required bodyguards, and Dr. Scher stated concern that this behavior could 
 
 
 203. Ed Silverman, Provenge, FDA Panels and Conflicts of Interest, PHARMALOT (July 6, 2007, 
6:01 PM), archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20080907225921/http://www.pharmalot.com/ 
2007/07/provenge-fda-panels-and-conflicts/ (blog no longer active, original text on file with author); 
Sharon Begley, Insight: New Doubts About Prostate-Cancer Vaccine Provenge, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 
2012, 9:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/30/us-provenge-idUSBRE82T07420120330.  
 204. Ed Silverman, The FDA, Conflicts of Interest & Provenge E-mails, PHARMALOT (Apr. 26, 
2011, 9:06 AM), archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20120719035414/http://www.pharmalot. 
com/2011/04/the-fda-conflicts-of-interest-provenge-e-mails/ (blog no longer active, original text on 
file with author).  
 205. Maggie Mahar, Medicare Will Pay $93,000 for Provenge: A Big Win for Wall Street, 
HEALTHBEAT (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.healthbeatblog.com/2011/04/medicare-will-pay-93000-for-
provenge-a-big-win-for-wall-street/.  
 206. Silverman, supra note 204.  
 207. Catherine Arnst, Pressure for Provenge Approval, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 30, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-07-30/pressure-for-provenge-approvalbusinessweek-
business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.  
 208. Begley, supra note 203. Scher points to the fact that the clinical studies did not meet their 
primary endpoints, “which renders the significance of the results from any subsequent analyses as 
‘exploratory’ and ‘hypothesis generating.’” He also points to methodological flaws, including the fact 
that the placebo administered may actually have had harmful effects, thus creating the appearance that 
Provenge was slowing the progression of the disease in the test subjects. Perhaps most importantly, the 
study’s authors in their analysis conceded that the effects of Provenge were not statistically significant. 
Both letters written to the FDA urging it not to approve Provenge are available at http://deepcapture. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/leakedletters.pdf. 
 209. William Meyers, Dendreon’s Provenge Revenue Trends, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 9, 2013, 
12:02 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/1102781-dendreon-s-provenge-revenue-trends.  
 210. CareToLive v. von Eschenbach, 525 F. Supp. 2d 938 (S.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d sub nom 
CareToLive v. Eschenbach, 290 F. App’x 887 (6th Cir. 2008).  
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dissuade doctors from voicing concerns about the drugs being evaluated in 
the approval process.
211
 
Hussain and Scher may or may not have been justified in their concerns 
for the drug’s efficacy; while some consumer advocates decry the delay as 
proof that conflicts of interest guided FDA actions that resulted in earlier 
deaths for thousands of men,
212
 others have challenged the efficacy of the 
drug and the credibility of the studies, just as Scher and Husaain did.
213
 
But their conflicts raise serious questions. Was their opinion objective? 
Would they have gone so far as to write the FDA commissioner personally 
were it not for their conflicts? Would patient advocates have reacted so 
violently if the committee were free of conflict? To be sure, individuals 
and groups without conflicts question the vaccine’s effectiveness214—
perhaps if these people were the ones to voice their concerns on the 
advisory committee, their opinions would not have been questioned so 
fiercely. This episode demonstrates the dangers of conflicts playing a role 
in the approval process for industry and for the integrity of and public trust 
in the approval process itself.  
C. The “Shared Pool Dilemma” Does Not Exist  
The “shared pool dilemma” is the idea that the most qualified experts 
on any given drug or device will usually have financial conflicts of interest 
because drug and device companies will have sought out their expertise.
215
 
Acceptance that this dilemma exists necessitates the conclusion that 
conflicts of interest on advisory committees are unavoidable, perhaps even 
preferable.  
On August 3, 2011, the non-profit Project On Government Oversight 
(“POGO”) sent a letter to FDA commissioner Margaret Hamburg urging 
 
 
 211. Andrew Pollack, Doctors Threatened for Opposing Drug, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/americas/04iht-docs.4.5991628.html?_r=0.  
 212. William Faloon, FDA Delay of One Drug Causes 82,000 Lost Life-Years, LIFE EXTENSION 
MAG., Nov. 2010, available at http://www.lef.org/magazine/mag2010/nov2010_FDA-Delay-of-One-
Drug-Causes-Lost-Life-Years_01.htm.  
 213. See Begley, supra note 203; Understanding Prostate Cancer: Diagnosis & Treatment, 
WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/prostate-cancer/guide/understanding-prostate-cancer-treatment? 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2014). 
 214. See, e.g., Joel T. Nowak, A New Controversy Surrounding Provenge Continues to 
Complicate the Decision to Use It, ADVANCEDPROSTATECANCER.NET (Mar. 31, 2012), 
http://advancedprostatecancer.net/?p=3140.  
 215. McComas et al., supra note 31.  
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her not to weaken conflict of interest standards.
216
 POGO points to several 
reports suggesting that the shared pool dilemma need not exist. They cite a 
federally funded research report by Harvard University’s Dr. Eric 
Campbell, which concluded that nearly 50% of research academics have 
no ties to industry and that approximately one-third of these researchers 
are full professors.
217
 They also pointed to a survey of participants who 
created clinical care guidelines for cardiology on behalf of the American 
College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association. Of the 
participants, 44% had no financial conflicts of interest.
218
 They further 
note that two journalists for the British Medical Journal (“BMJ”) cited 
nearly 100 medical experts without corporate ties in 2008.
219
 Notably, the 
BMJ authors write:  
Beyond the list’s usefulness to journalists, we hope that it will also 
be used by government agencies, medical journal editors, and 
professional societies as they seek out experts to serve as 
editorialists and members of clinical guideline and advisory panels. 
The FDA, for example, has a copy of the list.
220
 
All these findings suggest that the shared pool dilemma may not actually 
exist. As Lenzer and Brownlee maintain, conflicted scientists may be 
easier to find due to their names being on industry-sponsored 
publications,
221
 but in most cases they are not the exclusive experts in their 
field. The POGO letter concedes that convening a conflict-free panel is 
“an additional hurdle,” but, as they say, “that is exactly the point: we want 
expert advice that is as free as possible from the influence of industry.”222 
The fact that conflicted scientists may be easier to find than non-conflicted 
 
 
 216. Letter from Project On Gov’t Oversight to Margaret Hamburg, FDA Comm’r (Aug. 3, 2011), 
available at http://pogoarchives.org/m/ph/fda/fda-advisory-panels-letter-20110803.pdf [hereinafter 
Letter to Margaret Hamburg]. 
 217. Id. (citing Darren E. Zinner et al., Participation of Academic Scientists in Relationships With 
Industry, 28 HEALTH AFF., no. 6, at 181,425 (2009), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/28/6/1814.full.pdf).  
 218. Id. (citing Todd B. Mendelson et al., Conflicts of Interest in Cardiovascular Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, 171 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED., no. 6, at 577–85 (2011), available at http://archinte. 
jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=226953#qundefined).  
 219. Id. (citing Jeanne Lenzer & Shannon Brownlee, Medicine and the Media: Is There an 
(Unbiased) Doctor in the House?, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 206 (2008)). The POGO letter also discusses the 
fact that conflict of interest waivers are granted at a rate of less than 5%. However, as I discuss above, 
the percentage of committee members granted waivers may not be an accurate reflection of which 
members are conflicted.  
 220. Lenzer & Brownlee, supra note 219.  
 221. Id. 
 222. Letter to Margaret Hamburg, supra note 216.  
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scientists may be the basis for the insistence that the shared pool dilemma 
is real, but no statistical analyses exist to contradict Lenzer and 
Brownlee’s findings. Ed Silverman points out that committee position 
vacancies have been steadily declining in recent years, suggesting that, 
“despite the protestations from the pols who want the [regulations] 
loosened,” finding members without conflicts of interest is not as difficult 
as some would have the public believe.
223
  
D. The Economic Costs of Developing a Drug are Overstated 
A perhaps less important argument in favor of thorough conflict of 
interest regulations is that the cost of developing a drug is not the 
staggering figure pharmaceutical companies claim it to be, and thus the 
burden imposed on industry by the time required to convene a conflict-free 
panel is less significant. Though Matthew Herper and others estimate the 
cost of developing a drug to be in the billions,
224
 a 2011 study published in 
the journal BioSocieties disputes that estimate.
225
 The most commonly 
used figure, $1 billion, is based on a 2003 study conducted by the Tufts 
Center for the Study of Drug Development.
226
 PhRMA, a trade group 
representing pharmaceutical companies, estimated that inflation would 
make that figure approximately $1.3 billion in 2011 dollars.
227
 
Comparative healthcare professor Donald Light and economics professor 
Rebecca Warburon co-authored the BioSocieties article.
228
 They explain 
that the Tufts study was critically flawed due to sampling error, 
overestimates of inflation, and a failure to account for the fact that a 
significant percentage of development costs are federally funded.
229
 Most 
importantly, the Tufts study invited only twenty-four drug companies to 
participate in a survey, ten of which responded, and “if the Tufts Center 
group made any effort of its own to verify the information it received from 
the drug companies, the group makes no mention of it in the study.”230 
 
 
 223. Silverman, supra note 149. 
 224. Herper, supra note 123.  
 225. Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical 
Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34 (2011), available at http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/Biosocieties_ 
2011_Myths_of_High_Drug_Research_Costs.pdf (weblink to article with original pagination).  
 226. Id.  
 227. Timothy Noah, The Make-Believe Billion: How Drug Companies Exaggerate Research Costs 
to Justify Absurd Profits, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/ 
the_customer/2011/03/the_makebelieve_billion.single.html.  
 228. Light & Warburton, supra note 225. 
 229. Id. at 37–42; Noah, supra note 227.  
 230. Noah, supra note 227. 
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Light and Warburton argue that when the data is corrected for the 
quantifiable methodological flaws, the more accurate figure in 2011 
dollars is $55 million.
231
 They further state that the $55 million figure may 
be high because it is based on self-reports from drug companies 
themselves; “the audited costs of all clinical trials submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies in the late 1990s to the Internal Revenue 
Service averaged only $22.5 million.”232  
In 2009, the approval process took approximately thirteen months for 
standard drugs and nine months for priority applications.
233
 Given that the 
pharmaceutical company spends nineteen times more on advertising than 
it does on basic research,
234
 it does not seem unreasonable to ask these 
multi-billion dollar companies to wait the thirteen months–or however 
long it takes–to ensure that experts without conflicts of interest have 
deemed their product safe and effective.
235
  
E. Approving Drugs Faster for Patients in Need May Lead to a Slippery 
Slope of Capitalizing on their Desperation 
This final argument has not been stated clearly by the FDA, but is 
implicit in its reluctance to kowtow to the demands of patients’ groups. In 
November 2013, the FDA announced that it would not expedite the drug 
eteplirsen for approval for treatment of Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy 
while its safety and effectiveness is vetted through more sufficient trial 
data.
236
 It will not be eligible for approval for about two more years. The 
 
 
 231. Id.  
 232. Light & Warburton, supra note 225, at 47.  
 233. FDA, FY2010: PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FOR THE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT 4 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ 
ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/PDUFA/UCM243358.pdf. 
 234. Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin, Pharmaceutical Research and Development: What Do 
We Get For All That Money?, 345 BRIT. MED. J. e4348 (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www. 
pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf. 
 235. For a breakdown of Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company profits in 2012, see Fortune 500: 
Industries, CNN.COM, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/industries/21/ (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2014). Pharmaceutical companies may also argue that the time a drug spends in the 
approval process is time lost on its patent. See, e.g., Charles L. Hooper, Pharmaceuticals: Economics 
and Regulation, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.econlib. 
org/library/Enc/PharmaceuticalsEconomicsandRegulation.html. However, both Congress and the FDA 
have the power to extend exclusivity rights to drug companies for the duration the drug spent in the 
approval process, and frequently acts on this power. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION 
(2002), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS21129.pdf.  
 236. Joseph Walker, FDA Wants More Testing of Muscular-Dystrophy Drug, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
12, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304644104579193581328 
336774 (subscription required). 
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Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy community, including Jenn McNary, was 
“outraged,” but a regulatory affairs executive at a drug firm stated, “If 
we’re going to charge someone for a drug, we have to think there’s going 
to be a clinical benefit; otherwise it’s just hope.”237 Notably, the study only 
involves twelve boys and all evidence of improvement is indirect.  
Conflicts of interest are not the reason the FDA has yet to approve the 
drug, and McNary does not care what the reasons are; she just wants her 
son’s devastating condition to improve. This is what makes her 
particularly sympathetic and equally vulnerable, and this vulnerability is 
precisely the reason the FDA attempts to remain impervious to the desires 
of patient groups. If it did otherwise, it would open the door to the 
possibility that the desperation of patients and their families could be used 
against them.  
The FDA declined to expedite approval because a similar drug created 
by another company failed, and because “[r]egulators . . . questioned the 
validity of data showing an increased walking ability for patients taking 
eteplirsen because some boys couldn’t take the test.”238 Again, only twelve 
boys are participating in the study, and apparently some of them weren’t 
available to be tested for improvement. In both drugs’ tests, the levels of 
dystrophin—the muscle-protecting protein that Duchenne blocks–
increased in the subjects, which is supposedly an indicator of their 
improvement. However, their overall condition still deteriorated at a later 
stage in the rival drug company’s study. The FDA stated that negative 
results from the longer study “raises considerable doubt about the 
biomarker, and consequentially, its ability to reasonably likely predict 
clinical benefit.”239 
The patient community may be “outraged,” but what is the alternative? 
In many cases, it will be false hope and real money spent on a drug or 
device that will ultimately fail. If the FDA bows to the will of these groups 
and pharmaceutical companies and takes shortcuts in approval and review 
processes for products meant to treat life-threatening conditions, be they in 
the conflict of interest vetting process or review of trial data, it ultimately 
may fail its duty of ensuring that the products it approves for market are 
safe and effective.  
 
 
 237. Id. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Advocates for both easing and tightening conflict have legitimate 
arguments; both point to examples of conflict regulations preventing a 
desired outcome or causing a disastrous outcome. Patients have been 
harmed both by receiving unsafe but FDA-approved products and by not 
having access to a much-needed, but not yet approved, product. 
Quantitative studies have been conducted to determine the prevalence of 
conflict and whether conflicts lead to inappropriate approval or rejection 
of a product (although these studies are usually limited to conflicts that are 
reported). Von Eschenback and Hall write: “There is a compelling 
argument for letting patients and their doctors decide what risks to 
take.”240 This may be true, but it assumes that patients and doctors are 
thoroughly aware of the risks. The FDA’s task is to assess that risk and 
decide which products’ benefits outweigh their harms and which do not. 
The FDA is supposed to be an independent body that assures us that the 
products we use are more likely to help us than to harm us. Knowing that 
the committee on the FDA that made such a determination is free from 
financial interests that might cloud one’s judgment should help patients 
and doctors better assess the risks of using any given drug or device.  
Those on both sides of the debate appear not to appreciate just how 
much the risk-benefit analysis depends on the condition being treated. For 
example, applying the appropriate risk-benefit analysis, Ms. McNary’s son 
with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy should have access to the drug that is 
apparently helping her other son walk again, as long as she is made fully 
aware that improvement is unlikely based on the longer study of the 
competitor drug. Drugs for diabetes or high cholesterol, on the other hand, 
should not be as quickly available to patients; other treatments already 
exist, and the conditions are not as acutely serious.  
I suggest a balanced, sliding-scale approach based on the severity of 
the condition and the need for treatment. In June of 2012, Theresa Mullin, 
from the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, gave a 
presentation on the risk-benefit analysis applied in the approval process.
241
 
Its five key considerations are (1) severity of the condition to be treated, 
 
 
 240. Von Eschenbach & Hall, supra note 161. 
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(2) unmet medical need, (3) benefit, (4) risk, and (5) risk management.
242
 
Such a framework should be used not only in considering whether to 
approve a drug or device, but also in considering whom to allow to sit on 
advisory committees. If the condition is very severe and there is an unmet 
need for the treatment, waivers should be granted if doing so is necessary 
to expedite approval. If one of these three conditions is not met, no 
waivers should be granted under any circumstances.  
Furthermore, the FDA must not rely exclusively on self-reporting to 
determine a committee member’s conflicts of interest. If the FDA lacks the 
resources to check committee members’ financial interests thoroughly, 
Congress should grant it the power to raise user fees. Drug companies 
currently pay fees for expedited review; we should ensure that the review 
is objective. Finally, waivers must be granted to each participating 
member with a conflict of interest; the process should not allow for 
waiving the waiver process for conflicts deemed too small or too long ago. 
The waiver, the person granted it, and the type of conflict must be part of 
the public record (but not the magnitude of the conflict). This way, the 
public will have access to the existence of all conflicts on committees. Not 
only will patients and their physicians then have more information when 
making treatment decisions, but a committee member will also have to 
vote knowing that his or her conflict is public knowledge.  
These modest steps strike an appropriate balance between the need for 
beneficial drugs and the need to protect patients from harmful ones. They 
would lead to greater transparency and accountability in the FDA approval 
process, and could potentially save lives. 
Colleen O. Davis
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